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MODELS OF LAW 
Christian Turner* 
The more we examine what is behind our most difficult legal ques-
tions, the more puzzling it can seem that we continue both to disagree 
strongly and, yet, to cooperate. If law is a reasoned enterprise, how is it 
that we are neither torn apart nor homogenized by our long social prac-
tice of it? This Article resolves this puzzle and arrives at a richer under-
standing of law, using the idea of modeling familiar from the natural sci-
ences and mathematics. It shows (a) that theorists can model legal 
systems as abstract systems of institutions, information flows, and institu-
tional processing or reasoning and (b) that the participants in a legal sys-
tem themselves maintain and evaluate models of this sort. Understanding 
law this way clarifies numerous problems ranging from pluralism to legal 
interpretation. This work emphasizes four major points of the theory: 
(1) It identifies law as the conceptual side of cooperation and thus the 
means of coordinating decision-making. 
(2) It derives from human cooperation, a picture of legal systems as a 
network of institutions exchanging information and maintaining 
their own rules of recognition and decision. 
(3) It advances the thesis that cooperation and its associated legal sys-
tem arise when individuals create institution-information models, 
identify the models used by others, and accept the use of those mod-
els. 
(4) Finally, it provides a standard representation of institutions, their 
communications, and their reasoning. This analysis reveals that in-
stitutional agreement and disagreement occur at discrete levels. 
 
 *  Associate Professor, University of Georgia School of Law. For helping this Article along its long 
path, I thank the participants at the 2015 UGA-Emory Faculty Colloquium, especially Liza Vertinsky; the at-
tendees of the 2014 conference of the Association of Law, Property, and Society at the University of British 
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WINIR Conference: Institutions and Human Behavior; the faculty attending the University of Queensland T.C. 
Berne School of Law’s Research Seminar, especially the feedback and follow-up from Graeme Orr and Kit 
Barker; and the participants at the 2014 conference of the Law and Society Association of Australia and New 
Zealand. Special thanks to Christopher Elmendorf, Gregory Klass, Michael Madison, Joseph Miller, Usha Ro-
drigues, and Brian Tamanaha for reading earlier drafts and making key suggestions. Also, one more thank-you 
to Joseph Miller for, correctly, convincing me to cut my favorite scene. I am forever indebted to the research 
assistance of Michael Aune, Charles Spalding, Sam Weaver, Sterling Waite, Gregg Jacobson, Hunter Carpen-
ter, Brian Stoltz, and Matthew Traut. 
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Together, these elements yield a theory of legal systems that grounds 
jurisprudence in the study of the human conceptual system. It sheds new 
light on the problem of theoretical disagreement, otherwise puzzling prob-
lems of pluralism, and the connection between law and morality. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. The Fact of Legal Disagreement 
After the death of Justice Scalia, Senate Majority Leader Mitch 
McConnell and other Republican leaders stated that they would not consider 
any Supreme Court nominations made by President Obama.1 McConnell ar-
gued that the appointment would be highly consequential and, therefore, best 
made after the looming election by the people’s choice for the next President. Is 
this position legal or legitimate? 
The Constitution, in a section granting powers to the President, states that 
the President “shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the 
Senate, shall appoint . . . judges of the Supreme Court . . . .”2 This clause is sus-
ceptible to many interpretations as its words are bent toward application. Per-
haps it permits the Senate to refuse to hold hearings on any Supreme Court 
nominees, leaving plenary power in the Senate to decide how to advise and 
whether to consent. The actual words, one might argue, create no obligation for 
the Senate to consider a nomination, and the words are the end of the matter. 
What should we make, then, of the words that tells us that the President 
“shall appoint” “by and with the advice and consent of the Senate”?3 This in-
struction seems incompatible with a decision by the Senate to refuse to advise 
or even to consider consenting. Moreover, it seems odd that a single sub-
institution of the federal government could, through steadfast inaction, cause 
there to be no judges at all left in the judiciary. Indeed, other words of the Con-
stitution appear to assume that there will be a Supreme Court and, therefore, at 
least one federal judge: “The judicial power of the United States, shall be vest-
ed in one Supreme Court . . . .”4 
Reliance on words as authority or as the full embodiment of others’ au-
thority runs into another problem. They often fail to capture the real limits of 
what we are willing to accept. For example, the Constitution grants to Congress 
the power to impeach and remove from office the President, Vice President, 
and “all civil officers of the United States.”5 Would Congress have the power 
 
 1.  David M. Herszenhorn, G.O.P. Senators Say Obama Supreme Court Pick Will Be Rejected, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 23, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/24/us/politics/supreme-court-nomination-
obama.html. 
 2.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id. art. III, § 1. 
 5.  Id. art. I, §§ 2–3; id. art. II, § 4. 
  
1296 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2018 
under this clause to remove from office the President, Vice President, all cabi-
net members, and the entire bench of the Supreme Court? The Speaker of the 
House would become president,6 and the entire Supreme Court and cabinet 
could then be appointed, perhaps from Congress’s own ranks. If the Supreme 
Court has the ultimate power “to say what the law is,”7 would the new Justices 
be permitted to interpret the Constitution not to require further elections? If that 
is a “wrong” interpretation, what is the constitutional remedy? 
Any reader of this Article is more than able to construct the obvious and 
decent arguments on all sides of the above questions. The language, logic, and 
rhetorical form of such arguments are not difficult to grasp. That is not the 
problem. What makes selecting among legal solutions difficult, rather, is that 
there is no conceivable way to prove that any one of them is correct. There just 
is no uncontroversial theory of truth in law. While correctness is always and 
ultimately relative to an authority, there may not be agreement on what gives a 
rule its authority. What warrant is there for telling Mitch McConnell that he is 
wrong—that your criticism of his position reflects something other than a dif-
ference of opinion or of premises?8 
Every legal statement concerns what some other person should do in the 
social context in which the legal system arises. A person should pay a fine. A 
judge should use some statutory text to make a decision. A jailor should con-
fine a person designated as a prisoner. The Senate should hold confirmation 
hearings. Each of these statements about what others should do is obviously 
moored to other suppositions concerning social obligations—that word, 
“should,” carrying an implication that other truths underwrite the truth of the 
assertion itself. The judge is bound by constitutional legislative action. The 
jailor should follow orders of particular courts. The Senate is restrained and 
empowered by the Constitution. It is only within the context of such sets of 
supposed further truths that the isolated truth or falsity of the statement follows. 
When we disagree about what the law requires, or what we should do, our 
disagreement must either be in competing premises, those other truths that op-
erate both ultimately and interstitially, or in an error one of us has made in rea-
soning with them. Sound logic, dialogue, and training might be expected to de-
crease the incidence of the latter. The beast, though, lies in the former, finding 
that our disagreement stems from divergent premises—from different truth 
metrics. From such disagreements are launched thousands of volleys charging 
illegitimacy, judicial activism, tyranny, and mundane unreasonableness. 
One might hope that we could just be clear about premises. We may hope 
that we could uncontroversially identify an agreed-upon set of starting points 
 
 6.  3 U.S.C. § 19(a)(1) (2012). But see Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, Is the Presidential 
Succession Law Constitutional?, 48 STAN. L. REV. 113, 114–15 (1995) (arguing that the Constitution’s text, 
history, and structure should be read to forbid designation of federal legislators in the line of succession). 
 7.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
 8.  We have in law yet another version of the major puzzle of human social organization: “The big ques-
tion for scholars of ideas is why some ideas become the policies, programs, and philosophies that dominate 
political reality while others do not.” Vivien A. Schmidt, Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power 
of Ideas and Discourse, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 303, 307 (2008). 
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and interstitial glue, whether by studying the meaning of the word “law,” con-
sulting religious texts, discovering the truth of natural axioms, or even desig-
nating by fiat a particular text as ultimately authoritative. But our disagreement 
concerning the rules of the game reflects deeper disagreement concerning what 
the game is, revealing disparate attitudes toward and interpretations of these 
supposedly axiomatic texts, doctrines, and ideas.9 Minds can never truly and 
completely meet, because no mind is ever complete in its understanding of so-
cial reality. Our assessments and attitudes unfold. These attitudes simply cannot 
be corralled by any ultimate logic. Their genesis and evolution are in human 
minds, and they respond to the reality of lived experience, the collision of new 
problems with the old utterances.10 
What we conventionally call law is just the conceptual side of coopera-
tion. Every instance of human cooperation yields an explicit or implicit legal 
system governing that cooperation. This resulting legal system only exists, 
moment by moment, in the minds of participants as a capacity to generate men-
tal models of the cooperation itself. The system is perceived as law by a partic-
ipant when she accepts the models of the cooperation she identifies others as 
using. Further, we can describe these models as networked institutions ex-
changing information according to the institutions’ internally maintained pro-
gram for decision-making. Models of law exist in participants’ minds at many 
scales, from whole governments to more detailed models of legislatures or 
courts to contracting parties to families. They are generated on demand to an-
swer questions about the cooperation. As I will discuss, our mental experience 
of cooperation, and thus law, is not substantially different in this respect from 
our other experiences in life. 
This idea, that law is the adaptive, mental modeling of cooperation, is 
what I call the modeling theory of law. It would be surprising if jurisprudence 
could be anything but theorizing and studying the way human minds perceive 
legal systems. Being clear about this will orient legal theory toward the study of 
minds themselves. While the modeling theory of law helps make sense of tradi-
tional but persistent problems in legal theory, it also poses dramatic new ques-
tions for jurisprudence that point the way toward a possible cognitive science of 
law that would aim to increase our knowledge of how people perceive, evalu-
ate, and transmit regulatory information. A science of the phenomenon of law 
is the future of jurisprudence, law as itself a metaphysical science, its past. 
 
 9.  RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 238 (1986). Dworkin, in his famous chain-novel analogy, com-
pares the legal enterprise to literary criticism and notes that a critic of your conviction concerning how the next 
chapter of a book should unfold may “not [be arguing] that he thinks you should respect the text, while you 
think you are free to ignore it. Your disagreement is more interesting: you disagree about what respecting this 
text means.” Id. 
 10.  See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 128 (2d ed. 1994). 
[W]e are men, not gods. It is a feature of the human predicament (and so of the legislative one) that we la-
bour under two connected handicaps whenever we seek to regulate, unambiguously and in advance, some 
sphere of conduct by means of general standards to be used without further official direction on particular 
occasions. The first handicap is our relative ignorance of fact: the second is our relative indeterminacy of 
aim. 
Id. 
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B. A “Nonlegal” Example 
An example helps build the intuitions I hope to reward in the analysis that 
follows. Many legal philosophical treatments use the playing of games as an 
instructive analogue to legal systems.11 As will become apparent, I view the 
playing of games, like all other instances of cooperation, as generative of legal 
systems. The continuity or separateness of “game” systems from other legal 
systems is a property of the models of the respective systems their participants 
maintain and, thus, a matter of social convention rather than ontology.12 So let 
us consider a friendly game of Monopoly. 
Without saying much more about their reasons for doing so, three friends 
take Monopoly off the shelf, open the box, unfold the board, set up the cards, 
cash, and pieces, and begin to play. A few turns in, one player lands on States 
Avenue and announces that she does not wish to buy it. The next player then 
picks up the dice but is interrupted by the third, who tells the others they are 
forgetting to hold the auction. 
“I’m sorry. The what?” comes the response. “Yeah, when you land on an 
unowned property but you don’t want to buy it, the property’s auctioned off to 
the highest bidder.” 
“Ok . . . that’s not the way we’ve ever played. Sounds weird.” 
“Those are the rules. I know a lot of people don’t know about it. But 
look.” The third player then picks up the yellowing instruction booklet and 
turns to page four: 
Whenever you land on an unowned property you may buy that property 
from the Bank at its printed price. You receive the Title Deed card show-
ing ownership; place it faceup in front of you. 
If you do not wish to buy the property, the Banker sells it at auction to the 
highest bidder. The buyer pays the Bank the amount of the bid in cash 
and receives the Title Deed card for that property. Any player, including 
the one who declined the option to buy it at the printed price, may bid. 
Bidding may start at any price.13 
 
 11.  See, e.g., id. at 142–45 (arguing that rules of law are not merely whatever courts say they are just as 
the rules of an officiated game do not reduce to whatever a referee says they are); Scott Hershovitz, The End of 
Jurisprudence, 124 YALE L.J. 1160, 1181–86 (2015) (analyzing the origin of normativity of officially sanc-
tioned rules of chess). 
 12.  Here, as I discuss further in Part V, I agree with Brian Tamanaha’s argument that “law is whatever 
people identify and treat through their social practices as ‘law.’” BRIAN TAMANAHA, A GENERAL 
JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW AND SOCIETY 166 (2001). But I agree with him in two specific senses I believe com-
patible with his thesis: (1) The set of practices a society would call its “law” is identified by a social, conven-
tional practice of mutual categorization, and (2) the more general usage of “law,” the one I argue here is univer-
sal and which does not rely on a self-conscious societal labeling as such, is also socially constructed, arising 
from cooperation and the acceptance of the models’ participants identify as being used by others. This is the 
process that results in a society’s “identify[ing]” and “treat[ing]” physical behaviors in the world—writing 
judgments, voting on legislation, and arguing at a trial, for example—as part of a social construct we can call 
law. See infra Part III. 
 13.  HASBRO CORP., MONOPOLY: PROPERTY TRADING GAME FROM PARKER BROTHERS 4, http://www. 
hasbro.com/common/instruct/00009.pdf. 
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The other two players tell the third that, whatever might be printed in the 
rules, that is not how anyone they know has ever played Monopoly. And it is 
not how they intend to play this game. 
Each participant now has several things to think about. First, each might 
think about how the game ought to go, in light of its purpose, under the two 
possible rules. Which rule would make the game more fun, faster, more leisure-
ly, less antagonistic, more competitive, fairer, easier, harder, more official? 
Each could, in other words, evaluate the rules directly for their desirability. Of 
course, the players might fundamentally disagree on what makes a rule desira-
ble and on how the two rules under consideration would affect those desidera-
ta. They could disagree at a level of theory or of practice, reaching in either 
way different conclusions regarding how to play the game. 
Their thinking about these rules could, however, occur on a level above 
such direct analysis. Who should make the decision about the rule? The possi-
bilities here include the game’s original makers, the publishers of this edition, 
some notion of the general public practice, whatever a majority of them decides 
would be most desirable, whatever a majority decides but only if each is genu-
inely attempting to interpret the written rules rather than to replace them, what-
ever the owner of the house in which they are playing wants to do, whatever the 
owner of the board game wants to do, whatever the player most on the verge of 
quitting the game wants to do, and so on. 
At a still higher level of thinking, each could consider what reason he or 
she has to select the reason that will dictate who decides what the rule is: the 
pursuit of pure fun, the recognition of a least ambiguous source to promote co-
ordination, that hosting is an imposition and sociality is otherwise promoted by 
giving authority to hosts, that their continued relationships will be better if they 
just vote and get on with it. Our players are considering models of cooperative 
decision-making that involve different institutional actors transmitting infor-
mation and different rules to be used to evaluate that information. 
Whatever rules they choose, and even if they change their minds mid-
game, their game continues. Sure, an observer could snark that they are not “re-
ally” playing Monopoly. Fair enough, but what that person cannot say is that 
they are not playing a game. What is it that allows the players to do so? And on 
what grounds could a player tell the others they are “doing it wrong,” not just 
undesirably? 
If cooperation continues, so too does this legal system. Each player is ac-
cepting the model of rules they think is being used by the others. Those accept-
ed models may be incomplete and even at odds with one another. Indeed, each 
player has in mind not so much an encyclopedic list of rules but rather a capaci-
ty on demand to produce rules and evaluate rules announced by others. Players 
maintain, generate, and evaluate models of their cooperation at scales relevant 
to the issues that arise. For example, it is possible they agree at the inception to 
“play the game,” by which they all mean “to play in conformity with ‘the 
rules.’” And by “the rules,” they mean what they believe the instructions to 
mean for their game. They each believe that the others have such a model in 
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mind, and they cooperate on that basis. Whether the refinements and applica-
tions of these models that occur when controversies arise will result in the 
players discontinuing their cooperation depends on the judgments of each as 
play evolves. Their initial, naïve assumptions might be challenged by new facts 
that unearth formerly tacit commitments: to fun and friendship, perhaps. The 
cooperation, and thus the legal system among them that is quietly giving shape 
to that cooperation, may continue or disintegrate when one of them invokes the 
auction rule or when another proposes allowing a five-year-old to join and to 
move however many spaces are reflected by her five-year-old, rampaging id, 
without regard to dice. Their agreements and disagreements can occur at the 
level of fact, rule, identification of rule-maker, or theory for identifying rule-
maker.14 
What really distinguishes our Monopoly game from the game undertaken 
in the Senate? Yes, different sorts of decisions are being made; different conse-
quences are possible; different motivations may be found in participants. While 
the models of institutions and reasons that Senators maintain and generate—the 
ones that create the reality of cooperation in their minds—take into account dif-
ferent facts and values and involve different sources of information than do 
those of our Monopoly players, the basic process is the same. Modeling and ac-
ceptance are what form the internal, conceptual reality of cooperation. 
C. A Way Forward 
Thinking about constitutional disagreements alongside those of board-
game players is one of the more visceral ways to consider the problem of disa-
greement in law. Does a political opponent’s understanding of the appropriate 
reasons for institutional action, those reasons that lead her to argue that the 
Senate can do this or cannot do that, have the stability and fidelity to some 
principle, at some level of generality, that would cause you to accept it as legit-
imate, even if you disagree with her conclusion or even with her starting 
points? What deviations from your understanding of the right rules of Monopo-
ly or of the manner in which friends should play board games would you toler-
ate? Introspection suggests that when we cooperate we are often taking account 
of others’ reasons and perspectives, not simply calculating, for each possible 
action we might take, the probabilities that our fellow participants will inflict 
harms on us.15 
 
 14.  See infra Section IV.C. (discussing more rigorously these levels of agreement and disagreement). 
 15.  For Oliver Wendell Holmes, legal duties were “nothing but a prediction that if a man does or omits 
certain things he will be made to suffer in this or that way by judgment of the court.” Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 458 (1897). Holmes was as beautiful a thinker as he was a 
writer. While he argued that the laws could be externally described by potential, authoritative resolutions of 
disputes, the sharp end of the public’s stick (and, thus, that doing the law amounted to predicting the same), he 
did not suggest that the task of prediction, much less construction, was divorced from understanding others’ 
reasons: 
If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who cares only for the 
material consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his 
reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience. 
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This sort of question, whether you accept the model of social reality that 
is implicit in an argument another makes about the terms of your cooperation, 
is the one that points the way to a deeper, more accurate, and more rigorous 
understanding of legal systems. More to the point: now that we are all legal re-
alists and now that we acknowledge that there does not exist even the potential 
of an authoritative text that could definitively answer all legal questions,16 how 
are agreement and coherent disagreement still possible within the ordinary lan-
guage of law? The answer lies in candidly acknowledging our continuous mod-
eling and simulation of our social circumstances, not pretending no such mod-
els exist or that there is only one. 
Positivists argue that law is a system of authoritative guidance, the exist-
ence and content of which can be identified by social facts alone.17 But they are 
criticized for not adequately explaining why law, so understood, should obli-
gate anyone to follow it.18 And their efforts to explain radical disagreement 
about law’s content are not fully resolved.19 Natural lawyers, in contrast, point 
to an objective law derived from our study of the nature of human beings or 
from moral philosophy,20 but they do not so much explain the phenomenon of 
cooperative systems as define an ideal category. They can assert that such ideal 
law should be followed but do not give credible accounts of valid but theoreti-
cal disagreement in pluralistic societies. We need a new starting point that ap-
preciates that law is a product of human cognition in a social setting.21 The goal 
should be to understand the cooperative behaviors we call law in a way that 
makes sense of the fact that people disagree about what the law should be, what 
it is, and whether there is an obligation of some kind to follow it. 
This Article advances a theory of what we are doing when we do law that 
(a) characterizes the concept of law as inevitably joined to the fact of coopera-
tion, (b) locates that phenomenon in the physical activities of separate minds, 
 
Id. at 459 (emphasis added). 
 16.  LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927–1960 229 (1986); Joseph William Singer, Legal 
Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 465, 467 (1988) (reviewing LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927–
1960 (1986)). 
 17.  See, e.g., SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 27–28 (2011) (defining positivism and distinguishing it from 
natural law). 
 18.  See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 38–41 (1969) (arguing that an obligation of fidelity to 
law arises only under systems that observe basic moral tenets of good rule-making); see also John Finnis, Law 
and What I Truly Should Decide, 48 AM. J. JURIS. 107, 115 (2003) (“[A] complete and fully realistic theory of 
law can be and in all essentials has been worked out from the starting point of the one hundred percent norma-
tive question, what should I decide to do and, equivalently, what kind of person should I resolve or allow my-
self to be.”). 
 19.  See, e.g., Scott J. Shapiro, The “Hart-Dworkin” Debate: A Short Guide for the Perplexed, in 
RONALD DWORKIN 40–41 (Arthur Ripstein ed., 2007) (giving a crisp and lucid summary of Dworkin’s attack 
on positivism from theoretical disagreement). 
 20.  See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, A Law Professor’s Guide to Natural Law and Natural Rights, 20 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 655, 659–66 (1997) (characterizing natural law as resting on arguments of the form: “Given 
facts about human nature and the nature of the world . . . if you want to accomplish certain ends, then you 
should do X.”). 
 21.  Cf. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881) (“The life of the law has not been 
logic: it has been experience.”). 
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(c) helps make sense of the fact of legal agreement and disagreement, and 
(d) lays the groundwork for more sophisticated, accurate, and necessarily inter-
disciplinary modeling of the evolution of legal systems. 
I construct this theory in discrete parts: 
the Identity Framework, an understanding of law and cooperation as con-
ceptually bound to one another; 
the Institutions and Information Model, a description of an instance of such 
cooperation; 
the Modeling Thesis, asserting that law and cooperation arise from individ-
ual acts of modeling and of evaluation of such models; 
and the Institutional Representation, a standard language to describe insti-
tutional connections and reasoning. 
First, Part II lays out a framework under which law is understood as the 
conceptual side of cooperation. When we attempt to understand a group’s law, 
we aim to understand the conditions of its cooperation—whether the coopera-
tion itself and those conditions are implicit or explicit. So understood, coopera-
tion and law are two sides of the same phenomenon, like mass is to gravity. An 
instance of cooperation entails the existence of a legal system, even if only im-
plicit, and to identify a legal system is to identify cooperating decision-makers. 
I label this claim the Identity Framework. 
This move dispenses with the distracting and, I argue, illusory problem of 
distinguishing law from other norm-thick but “unofficial” group activities. And 
it will allow us to make sense of the connection between moral principles and 
legal principles. 
Once the problem of law is understood as describing how human beings 
conceive of their cooperation, we will become interested in the management 
within the mind of social complexity. In particular, legal systems, whether tra-
ditional or not, can be modeled as a collection of public and private infor-
mation-exchanging institutions. I call this the Institutions and Information 
Model of legal systems, and I argue that it arises naturally from the Identity 
Framework. 
Part III advances the Modeling Thesis that law itself (and, therefore, co-
operation) arises from individual acts of modeling. Law is social reality per-
ceived and, thus, modeled. Our perception of law is a compound process of 
identifying the models of cooperation used by others, constructing our own 
models, and experiencing attitudes arising from the simulation of real and im-
agined inputs to those models. Cooperation, from the internal point of view of 
an individual, amounts to accepting models one perceives as describing the par-
ticipation and decision-making of others. This understanding leads to specific, 
cognitively grounded criteria for law. 
Part IV develops a common language, the Institutional Representation, 
for the mental models that people maintain about cooperation. Legal systems 
can be described as systems of information-connected, decision-making institu-
tions. Each such modeled institution (a) receives inputs from other institutions, 
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(b) processes those inputs according to sets of reasons, and (c) produces infor-
mational output. Institutions within a modeled legal system maintain their own 
sets of reasons for decision-making, those reasons terminating in a local, ulti-
mate rule of recognition. And institutions are stitched together into systems be-
cause they each possess rules that take account of the information produced by 
other institutions. The structure of rules in such models can be analyzed in 
terms of discrete levels, as in our Monopoly example above. 
Part V briefly surveys how the modeling theory of legal systems confronts 
the traditional questions of jurisprudence, including how laws are identified, 
how identification rules avoid infinite recursion, the source of law’s normativi-
ty, the relation of law to morality, and the problem of interpretation. 
Ultimately, the modeling theory of legal systems stakes out a jurispruden-
tial claim but does not fit comfortably within any of the dominant genres of 
theories of law. While it is indeed fundamentally positivist, identifying the ex-
istence of law and law’s content with acts of mental modeling, it does not sup-
pose there must exist a system of identifiable rules and is fully compatible with 
radical indeterminism. It acknowledges the problem of theoretical disagree-
ment, but it is not interpretivist and does not suppose that legal questions have 
single right answers. And it certainly does not depend on there being any inal-
terable rules that would underwrite the rest of a legal system. This is not a theo-
ry of natural law. It is, rather, a suggestion that if understanding cooperation is 
what we are ultimately after, then we must understand cooperation. 
II. THE IDENTITY FRAMEWORK 
Let us establish first that the perception of a legal system is identical to 
the perception of cooperation. Human cooperation instantiates a legal system, 
and to observe a legal system is to observe cooperation.22 This will reveal that 
the struggle to distinguish law from not-law is often better understood as an ef-
fort to distinguish instances of cooperation from one another on conventional 
grounds, rather than on the basis of truly fundamental, ontological differences. 
A. Publics 
When people cooperate, they become more than a collection of individu-
als. Cooperation entails coordination of not just action but decision-making. 
People and some other animals cooperate,23 but rocks do not, even if we recog-
 
 22.  See Christian Turner, Origins of the Public/Private Theory of Legal Systems, in PRIVATE LAW: KEY 
ENCOUNTERS WITH PUBLIC LAW 117, 120–22 (Kit Barker & Darryn Jensen eds., Cambridge University Press 
2013). 
 23.  Biologists have identified true communicative cooperation in nonhuman animals. “Recent theory and 
experimental studies suggest that hidden threats may play a similarly important role [as they do in human legal 
systems] in shaping the social behaviour of animals. In particular, threats to terminate a potentially profitable 
interaction may limit the level of selfishness in cooperative groups.” Michael A. Cant, The Role of Threats in 
Animal Cooperation, 278 PROC. ROYAL SOC’Y B. BIOLOGICAL SCI. 170, 170 (2010). Researchers have posited 
several requirements for hidden threats (potential sanctions) to be effective in fostering rule compliance among 
other animals. Most interesting, for this project, is the requirement that both those able to deliver on a threat 
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nize that the past and future of a rock in a scree field depends on the move-
ments of its fellow rocks. It is not enough, though, that a group consists of deci-
sion-makers to engage in cooperation. There is, yet, more in cooperation than 
the actions resulting from multiple but separate individual volitions that are 
each blind to the other volitions.24 Coordination of decision-making implies 
members of the group take account of the thinking of some others in the group. 
I will use the term public to mean a group of cooperating individuals.25 
How does a public coordinate its decision-making and, thus, cooperate? Law. 
That is the word I will use to describe the conditions the group places on its 
members to achieve cooperation.26 Law, then, is an inevitable feature of coop-
 
and other members of the cooperating community have information concerning the nature of the threat and the 
values to community members of exit. Id. at 174–75. Thus, they must be able to run models of the sort I de-
scribe in Section III.C. It is unclear, though, whether some of our closest animal relatives infer and judge the 
models of other participants in the way I suppose humans do. See, e.g., Michael Tomasello, The Ultra-Social 
Animal, 44 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 187, 192 (2014) (“[A]lthough many primates make simple causal and inten-
tional inferences about external events, only humans make socially recursive and self-reflective inferences 
about others’ or their own intentional states (e.g., she thinks that I think …).”). 
 24.  It is conceptually possible but hard to imagine nonintentional groups, where humans come together 
to accomplish a task that would be impossible without their joint inputs but where they are each unaware of the 
other. See UPSTREAM COLOR (ERBP 2013); see also CHRISTIAN LIST & PHILIP PETTIT, GROUP AGENCY: THE 
POSSIBILITY, DESIGN, AND STATUS OF CORPORATE AGENTS 33 (2011) (noting the possibility of cooperation 
through cell-structures, where a coordinator brings together functional groups that are unaware of each other). 
My notion of cooperation does not require awareness of cooperation between each pair of participants, thus 
capturing cell-structured groups, but it does require participation in a decision-making group. 
 25.  This definition of a public demands more than some such definitions and less than others. Sociolo-
gists, in search of what we mean by “public opinion,” have distinguished crowds, “defined by their shared emo-
tional experiences,” and masses, “defined by their interpersonal isolation.” CARROLL J. GLYNN, SUSAN HERBST, 
MARK LINDEMAN, GARRETT J. O’KEEFE & ROBERT Y. SHAPIRO, PUBLIC OPINION 12 (3d ed. 2016) (citing 
VINCENT PRICE, PUBLIC OPINION (1992)). But a public is a group that discusses its divisions on issues confront-
ing it. Id. at 13 (citing HERBERT BLUMER, COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR (1946)). Robert Park’s notion of the differ-
ence between a public and a crowd strikes even closer to the idea here and to what follows: A public thinks and 
reasons together based on “facts,” which are “idealized structures” that “take the place of concrete reality.” 
They are idealized objects that make public communication practicable. ROBERT E. PARK, THE CROWD AND 
THE PUBLIC AND OTHER ESSAYS 5 (Henry Elsner, Jr. ed., 1972). Legal scholars have sometimes converged on 
the same notion. See Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, 
Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 603, 634 (1990) (“A public, in 
other words, is constituted precisely by the ability of persons to speak to one another across the boundaries of 
divergent cultures.”). Post’s notion of a public was aimed at understanding the structure of public discourse and 
the role of the First Amendment in protecting that discourse. He drew on the work of sociologists who attempt-
ed to explain how publics arise from mere groups in response to the challenge to cooperation posed by cultural 
diversity. Id. (citing Carroll Clark, The Concept of the Public, 13 SW. SOC. SCI. Q. 311, 314 (1933)). But the 
apparent demandingness of the criteria for public-constituting discourse (of the kind the First Amendment is 
intended to protect) is not really any greater than my apparent undemandingness. Post required there be (1) 
more than a single culture so that there was some contest to be worked out through discourse, (2) a desire to 
preserve heterogeneity, (3) some common basis of communicative objects (facts, ideas, issues), (4) reasons to 
engage in the discourse (whether profit or other purposes), and (5) “commonly accepted standards of meaning 
and evaluation.” Id. at 634–36. It is interesting that these definitions share the concept of a group of communi-
cating entities that have some common purpose, that are an interaction of minds and not just bodies. I require 
nothing more than that but also nothing less. Anything more embeds views concerning how cooperation is not 
just accomplished at all, but also how it is best accomplished. 
 26.  I define law here to describe a phenomenon invariably attached to cooperation, in other words, law as 
cooperation’s conceptual side. Later, in Part III, I will argue that its content arises from mutual acts of mental 
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eration. These basic definitions binding law and cooperation, which I call the 
Identity Framework, are fundamental. The framework does not, on its own, tell 
us much about law’s nature or how to identify its content in a given instance of 
cooperation. But it delimits that which we hope to understand. 
We can make several observations about law, so understood, based on un-
controversial assumptions about human beings. First, law must occur through 
communication: written laws, opinions, verbal orders, rules, the display of a 
firearm, and perhaps the information implicit in acts of enforcement. Indeed, 
any sort of coordination among human beings must somehow involve the 
transmission of thought through the air gap that separates our skulls. “There is 
no direct communion between the minds of men,” but instead we must “resort[] 
to the outward manifestation of that which moves us inwardly, that is, to 
signs.”27 To engage in the practice of law, therefore, entails the processing and 
ordering of certain communications. 
Second, and without loss of generality, we can describe these communica-
tions as effecting the public’s management of its coercive resources.28 Such re-
sources are present wherever there is cooperation, because, at the very least, 
discontinuing cooperation is always possible as are other potential forms of in-
ducement, from the potential to be recognized as a rule-breaker to explicit 
threats of violence.29 But no matter how plain or hidden, a public ultimately 
coordinates its decision-making through the management of these resources.30 
While some scholars have rejected a focus on sanction as a defining char-
acteristic of legal systems,31 they broadly agree on the centrality to law’s func-
tioning of coercive potential. As Robert Cover put it: “Legal interpretation is 
 
modeling by its participants. See infra Part III. So, the mere fact that law exists among a group can be verified 
by observing cooperation, but identifying law’s content requires cognitive investigation. 
 27.  FRANCIS LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICIAN HERMENEUTICS, OR PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION AND 
CONSTRUCTION IN LAW AND POLITICS WITH REMARKS ON PRECEDENTS AND AUTHORITIES 2 (1839). 
 28.  Turner, supra note 22, at 121. 
 29.  My account of legal systems as bound to cooperation and as a sum of individual attitudes might seem 
to be “singularist,” as Margaret Gilbert uses the phrase. See MARGARET GILBERT, ON SOCIAL FACTS 12 (1989). 
For Gilbert, understanding sociality as “‘me watching you watching me’ does not approach the heart of the 
matter.” MARGARET GILBERT, JOINT COMMITMENT: HOW WE MAKE THE SOCIAL WORLD 4 (2014). Rather, 
joint commitment requires individuals each to commit to something in a way they all understand commits them 
together and to one another. Id. at 7. It is this process that causes them to owe each other obligations, relations 
that cannot arise singularly. I need not, in this introductory work, throw my lot in with John Searle, Michael 
Bratman, or Gilbert. I can build a legal theory by taking the fact of cooperation as both primitive and human-
observable and assuming that people can recognize it, decide to enter it, and choose to be bound by correspond-
ing obligations. That said, my theory does suggest a view of cooperation. But elaborating that view in a manner 
that engages the relevant philosophical literature on joint action is beyond the scope of this work. 
 30.  Christian List and Philip Pettit’s definition of joint intention captures much of the idea of a public 
and its cooperation that I identify here. See LIST & PETTIT, supra note 24, at 33–34. It has four features: (1) a 
shared goal, (2) individual contribution, (3) interdependence (meaning that intentions are formed at least partly 
because of beliefs that others have the same intentions), and (4) common awareness (a belief that others have 
these beliefs about the group). They contrast a group of people cooperating to carry a piano downstairs, in 
which there is joint intention, to bargain hunters who collectively drive the price of a good down to a competi-
tive level (a group that lacks joint intention among them). Id. 
 31.  SHAPIRO, supra note 17, at 77 (criticizing sanction-centered theories, namely Austin’s, for failing to 
account for the people’s common sense of obligation and not just threat arising from law). 
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(1) a practical activity, (2) designed to generate credible threats and actual 
deeds of violence, (3) in an effective way.”32 Even H.L.A. Hart, writing against 
the coercion-driven command theory of John Austin,33 recognized that “[l]egal 
rights and duties are the point at which the law with its coercive resources re-
spectively protects individual freedom and restricts it or confers on individuals 
or denies to them the power to avail themselves of the law’s coercive machin-
ery.”34 We can relax any intuition we might have about coercion’s martial na-
ture and see it even in the mere withholding of approval or common recogni-
tion of defection. We can also take the view that a legal system uses coercion 
only as a means but that the purpose is to guide right conduct. What is insepa-
rable from cooperation, however, is that there is trans-personal understanding 
of expectation and consequence, however vaguely appreciated. 
Third, law, defined as broadly as I have here, is everywhere. Our world 
consists of many separate but interacting publics and, therefore, legal systems. I 
am governed by the laws of the United States and the state in which I reside, 
local zoning ordinances, the terms of my employment, the constraints imposed 
by family, the norms of neighborliness, the terms of various contractual agree-
ments, the morality into which I have become socialized, and other limitations 
of which I am hardly aware. We are the subjects of a cacophony of authorities 
arising from our membership in a corresponding cacophony of publics. Much 
of the trouble in legal theory—distinguishing “law” from mere “norms,” for 
example—begins to resolve once we appreciate that a particular legal rule, 
norm, or moral principle is bound to one of the many different publics to which 
we belong.35 
As will become more important in what follows, we can observe that how 
these publics are related, whether one is a subsidiary of another or otherwise 
related, is a matter of our point of view and the point of our comparing them. 
Contracting parties, for example, may not be a separate public but a private ar-
rangement within a broader public. They are private parties using the apparatus 
of a state’s laws to achieve their own purposes. This is neither true nor false. 
Rather, it is only a possible description, or model, of complex phenomena oc-
curring in the world. 
A subgroup together with its purposes can be private relative to a public 
in two senses. First, it might be private in the sense that it is free to pursue its 
own conception of the good and that the public will use its coercive resources 
to aid in that effort. In this case, a coercive resource of this private group is the 
potential to resort to the coercive resources of the public in which it is embed-
ded. For example, contract law is the body of law that identifies such private 
institutions and the conditions under which the public will lend its coercive re-
sources to such institutions’ privately made laws. When it does so, facilitating 
 
 32.  Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1610 (1986). 
 33.  JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE OR THE PHILOSOPHY OF POSITIVE LAW 88–106 (3d ed. 
1869) (characterizing law as the commands of a sovereign, habitually obeyed, backed by threats). 
 34.  HART, supra note 10, at 269. 
 35.  See infra Section II.B. 
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these private purposes becomes an objective, if not the only objective, of the 
public’s cooperation.36 
The other relevant sense of “private” is one implying a yet further degree 
of separation from the public of which the group’s members are also a part. A 
private group within a public might pursue its purposes outside the system of 
conditional coercion maintained by the public. The maintenance of manners 
among friends, for example, might not be enforceable according to the rules of 
the state, a public of which they are also members. From the perspective of the 
state, whatever “law of manners” exists among these friends is “private private” 
law, not private law in the sense of the first type of private subgroup (as exem-
plified by contracting parties). Any enforcement of the friends’ rules of man-
ners must be accomplished through the coercive resources this group of friends 
maintains on its own, not those maintained by the public.37 
Importantly, though, each private group, of either of the above two types, 
is yet another public when viewed from within itself by its members. A private 
group maintains its own coercive resources and has, as we will see in what fol-
lows, models for their use. This yields a principle of public relativity—that a 
group within a public can be viewed as a subgroup but also as constituting an-
other public. A family is both its own public and a private entity within a 
broader public. A legislature is both its own public, its members bound by its 
rules, and a subgroup within the broader public that is, the state. The way we 
perceive legal entities is a matter of perspective. The usefulness of a perspec-
tive depends on our reason for observing. 
I will soon argue that individuals’ dynamically generated mental models 
of cooperation are what give form and meaning to law,38 the conceptual side of 
the cooperation within a given public. Such models also give rise to whatever 
self-conception its members maintain of their grouphood—that is, to whether 
its members think of the group as an independent source of rules and obliga-
tions, an organ of the broader public, or both. But more on subgroups will fol-
low after we have developed a concrete language of cooperation. 
Finally, let us define an institution to be a subgroup of a public that com-
municates information that (a) the public takes into account when managing its 
coercive resources and (b) the subgroup’s members intend to be so taken.39 Be-
 
 36.  See Gregory Klass, Three Pictures of Contract Law: Duty, Power, and Compound Rule, 83 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1726, 1769–73 (2008) (assessing that the existing body of contract law possesses both duty-imposing 
elements and power-conferring elements, the latter of which are concerned with advancing private purposes). 
 37.  The public has many choices to make concerning when to allow “private private” rules to be main-
tained and when to preempt them, prohibit them, or incorporate them. See, e.g., David Fagundes, Talk Derby to 
Me: Intellectual Property Norms Governing Roller Derby Pseudonyms, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1093, 1131–43 (2012) 
(arguing that the formalized but nonlegal protection of roller-derby names is preferred by the derby community 
and enhances the community’s values). 
 38.  See infra Part III. 
 39.  We have not arrived at a theory of rules yet. Modeling theory and a theory of rules go together and 
will be developed below. See infra Part IV. For now, the intuitive notion that a legal institution is one that gen-
erates legally relevant information will suffice. But I ultimately mean something broader by legally relevant 
than Hart’s notion that a rule is given authority by a secondary rule which itself is ultimately dependent on a 
singular rule of recognition. HART, supra note 10, at 91–99. 
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cause legal systems are coordination by communication, and because commu-
nication occurs between and among groups of people, we can model a legal 
system as a union of institutions and information. 
As Robert Cover teaches: 
The context of a judicial utterance is institutional behavior in which oth-
ers, occupying preexisting roles, can be expected to act, to implement, or 
otherwise to respond in a specified way to the judge’s interpretation. 
Thus, the institutional context ties the language act of practical under-
standing to the physical acts of others in a predictable, though not logical-
ly necessary, way.40 
In the most important tract in the canon of legal positivism, H.L.A. Hart 
defined law as the union of primary and secondary rules, all ultimately backed 
by social acceptance of an ultimate rule that identifies the others.41 Hart’s ac-
count is consistent with the picture of law I am developing. But I seek to extend 
his basic mechanism—acceptance of the rule of recognition42—beyond a static 
frame in which participants either do or do not accept a singular, although po-
tentially complex, ultimate rule.43 Ours is a world in which people are members 
of many, sometimes conflicting legal communities and in which different insti-
tutions within a community may radically differ concerning the cooperation. If 
we observe a group and are asking whether there is law among them, whether 
they are coordinating their decision-making, then as Hart correctly observed,44 
we are asking something about their mental attitudes toward information they 
have produced. To explore that question but in the realistic context of dynamic 
and pluralistic societies, I will first develop some ideas about such attitudes and 
then turn to criteria for those attitudes to establish law.45 
To summarize, a public is an instance of human cooperation. Every public 
can be identified with a legal system if law is defined as the conceptual side of 
that cooperation, the coordination of the public’s decision-making. It comprises 
communications among the public concerning the management of the public’s 
coercive resources. These communications occur among members of the public 
and between groups within it. Groups within a public can be viewed as a dis-
tinct public, as they form another cooperative instance, but also as subgroups of 
the public in which they are embedded. Families, legislatures, corporations, and 
groups of friends are both subgroups of a larger public and cooperating groups 
in their own right. Institutions are subgroups that supply legally relevant infor-
mation, and thus, we can describe a legal system as a union of institutions and 
information. 
 
 40.  Cover, supra note 32, at 1611. 
 41.  HART, supra note 10, at 97–99. 
 42.  Id. at 100–17. 
 43.  Id. at 100 (“Wherever [the] rule of recognition is accepted, both private persons and officials are 
provided with authoritative criteria for identifying primary rules of obligation.”). 
 44.  Id. at 88–91 (discussing “the internal point of view” of rules). 
 45.  See infra Section III.D. 
  
No. 4] MODELS OF LAW 1309 
B. Law and Norms 
A description of a legal system sets out the conceptual side of an instance 
of cooperation in terms of discrete institutions and the informational connec-
tions between them. This suggests that there is law where we might intuitively 
only suspect there are norms. Indeed, the information-and-institution descrip-
tion of law reframes the burning question that has launched many a jurispru-
dential expedition: what properties distinguish laws from norms that are not 
law? 
My answer is that there is no metaphysical difference between norms and 
laws as such. If an observer perceives one thing as a law and another as merely 
a norm, the real difference will ultimately be found in the distinction he or she 
makes between the cooperative communities that are their sources. One com-
munity contains the thing intuitively identified as a law and the other the thing 
identified as a norm. They are both publics, and both, therefore, have legal sys-
tems. Our intuition may want to find some essential difference in the infor-
mation itself, in the relations among bits of information, or in some endogenous 
property of relative bindingness distinguishing the law from the norm.46 But we 
look in the wrong place. Without distinct concepts of the communities associat-
ed with the information perceived as constituting the norm and with that per-
ceived as constituting the law, there could be no way to distinguish the two in 
any language concerning authority or obligation. Obligation itself, including 
the necessity of strict compliance and the acceptability of deviation, derives 
from one’s understanding of what a public requires.47 
Not only is our attitude toward using the labels “law” and “norm” in fact 
dependent on our attitude toward the public whose conditions we are examin-
ing, but so too is our attitude toward true compliance or defection. Every public 
yields a distinct domain of normativity.48 Each generates an obligating force 
 
 46.  Scott Shapiro distinguishes legal communities from other rule-bound planning communities using a 
property he calls “self-certifying.” SHAPIRO, supra note 17, at 221. An organization is “‘self-certifying’ when-
ever it is free to enforce its rules without first demonstrating to a superior (if one exists) that its rules are valid.” 
Being “free to enforce” means that the organization is not subject to higher authority or, if it is, “enjoys a gen-
eral presumption of validity” from them. Id. Shapiro acknowledges that organizations lie along a spectrum of 
self-certfyingness, with the United States at one end, states close by, and condominium boards closer to lacking 
the property entirely. Id. at 222–23. I think Shapiro is correct that bilateral hierarchical responsiveness is indeed 
an interesting property that can be measured at an instant in time. The degree to which one group must demon-
strate to another group the validity of its rules before enforcing them might interest us. I do not think, however, 
that we gain much by drawing a stark line, as using the word “law” does, between the various communities that 
coordinate their decision-making. Nearly everything about the structure of rules, psychological attitudes toward 
them, and their fit with other systems applies just as well to municipal legal systems as to corporate govern-
ance, family structures, and the mafia. Indeed, some “official” legal systems may resemble the latter types more 
than they do our experience with the former. 
 47.  I discuss the problem of law’s normativity within the modeling theory in greater detail in infra Sec-
tion V.B. 
 48.  It would appear that this claim puts me in direct opposition to Scott Hershovitz, who suggests we 
should be skeptical that there is a “distinctively legal domain of normativity.” Hershovitz, supra note 11, at 
1186–92. But the very generality of my identification of publics and legal systems, and the suggestion that they 
are one, is actually a ground for believing his assertion that there is nothing particularly special, as a class, 
about traditionally recognized legal systems. Thus, I ultimately agree with Hershovitz that a legal system does 
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like gravitation, posing to each participant the question whether and to what ex-
tent to join in its cooperative enterprise. Just as “mass” is the name we have to 
describe whatever it is that gives rise to an object’s force of gravitation, so too 
“normativity” is the word we use to describe the obligating force. To violate a 
public’s rule is to defect from its enterprise. And the morality of such defection 
is ultimately judged by the basic moral question of whether and to what extent 
cooperation within that public is good or bad. Thus, law’s normativity arises 
from the attitudes of participants toward the community’s cooperation. 
We have seen that publics and their corresponding legal systems can be 
identified with instances of cooperation and that legal systems work through 
institutions sharing information that is ultimately used to determine the applica-
tion of coercive resources. Any group of people probably gives rise to many 
interacting publics. The normativity of each such public’s law arises from the 
perceived morality of defection from the cooperation that defines the public in 
the first place. 
But prior to any exercise of normative design, critique, or comparison, we 
should better understand these institutions, the information among them, how 
they are identified by participants, and what their relation is to what those par-
ticipants would call the law. Are they defined specifically by law itself? 
Wouldn’t that be circular? 
If we take a public, its institutions, its information transmissions, and its 
informational networks among institutions as fundamental objects, then, yes, 
we have the basis for a model of the public’s law. We have the vinegar and clay 
to make our model volcano, and we have the time, extent, and variables to sim-
ulate hydraulic flow in an idealized aquifer. But that is not yet an argument that 
such a description of law implies anything concerning the nature of legal disa-
greement or, more broadly, what might control the origins, mutations, and 
deaths of patterns of legal practice. What else can we say about models of this 
sort? 
III. THE MODELING THESIS 
A. Why Models? 
I have argued thus far that law is the conceptual side of cooperation and 
that it can be modeled as a network of institutions and information among par-
ticipants. I now go further and argue that not only can a legal system be mod-
eled but that it can also be understood as an emergent property of acts of mod-
eling by the participants in a cooperative enterprise. 
 
not create a distinctively “legal” set of reasons for complying with its commands. But that is because I think 
obligation-generation is a property of a public, a property of each group to which one belongs. They are all 
distinct domains of normativity. But our reflective attitude toward traditionally labeled legal regimes is not 
different in kind than our attitude toward compliance with other regimes, other publics to which we belong. As 
to all, the morality of defection from the conditions of cooperation follow from moral judgments concerning the 
cooperation itself. And so “we can represent law as continuous with the other normative practices.” Id. at 1193. 
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In Legality, Scott Shapiro begins by discussing, just as Hart did, what a 
funny question it is: “What is law?”49 No one asks what medicine is, they ob-
serve. Medical professionals just sort of get on with it and do not seem to be 
hampered by asking themselves what they are doing when they set a bone or 
resect a tumor. As a student of jurisprudence, I had taken as true this starting 
point for elaborating the concept of law—that our job was to understand law’s 
distinction from these other fields. But I am now convinced that doing so is the 
beginning of an error. Distinguishing law from disciplines that seem uncon-
cerned with their concepts puts us on a trajectory to define law’s specialness. 
But law is not special. In fact, our thoughts about law are not unlike our think-
ing about other aspects of our experience. 
After all, people do indeed ask “what is medicine” and “what is the 
body.” We, in fact, provide different answers in different situations to the ques-
tion of what the human body is, and we unthinkingly shift between them. What 
medicine is and what a surgeon does are functions of the particular way of 
thinking of the body that seems most responsive to whatever the problem at 
hand is. And so, while we may not ask out loud what the human body is, we do 
answer that question implicitly and repeatedly. 
Whatever its smallest parts, the body has a separate identity as a concept 
only because of our higher level descriptions of the patterns of matter that 
compose it and the consequences its existence can create. Depending on the 
question being asked, the human body can be described as its whole form ani-
mated by human behaviors over time, as a combination of major organs and 
their arrangement in a given instant, as an organization of tissues, as a pattern 
of molecules, as characteristic patterns of atoms and energy, as quarks. The 
term “body” is itself a conceptual object, hiding behind a single word immense 
complexity and containing within it ever more detailed conceptual objects that 
need only be consulted if the question of the moment goes that deeply. 
So too everything! The world, to us, is not a thing, but our mental repre-
sentations concerning idealized versions of things and abstract relations among 
things. A cathedral exists as a “cathedral” only in our minds. What we label 
“cathedral” is a particular set of ideas and stories about our relation to certain 
arrangements and evolutions of matter, not the arrangements themselves. We 
function by maintaining not just abstract tokens representing perceptions of 
things but mental models of our world. 
In 1943, the psychologist Kenneth Craik advanced this idea in The Nature 
of Explanation: 
By a model we thus mean any physical or chemical system which has a 
similar relation-structure to that of the process it imitates. . . . My hypoth-
esis then is that thought models, or parallels, reality—that its essential 
feature is not ‘the mind,’ ‘the self’, ‘sense-data’, nor propositions but 
symbolism . . . . If the organism carries a ‘small-scale model’ of external 
reality and of its own possible actions within its head, it is able to try out 
 
 49. HART, supra note 10, at 1; SHAPIRO, supra note 17, at 1. 
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various alternatives, conclude which is the best of them, . . . and in every 
way to react [better] to the emergencies which face it.50 
“[Craik] suggested that the mind builds small-scale models of the world, 
which it uses to anticipate events and to guide its decisions. Mental models are 
constructed as a result of perceiving the world, understanding descriptions, and 
imagining possibilities.”51 
Researchers Stefan Groesser and Martin Schaffernicht describe mental 
models as comprising logical assertions that are linked and then used with input 
data to reach conclusions.52 They ultimately suggest a more complex under-
standing of mental models of dynamic systems, but, for now, the important 
point is that an internal representation of a system is “run” in the mind to make 
decisions and to understand complexity. 
A mental model is constructed in working memory and can then be run 
like a computer simulation allowing an individual to explore and test dif-
ferent possibilities mentally before acting. Working memory is the system 
responsible for selecting and manipulating information for the purpose of 
reasoning and learning. Changes made to a mental model in the simula-
tion process represent what would happen if such changes took place in 
reality.53 
In fact, cognitive scientists have suggested that the human conceptual sys-
tem is a simulating system.54 Our thinking, under this view, is “a distributed 
neural mechanism that constructs an infinite set of specific simulations to rep-
resent a category, property, or relation dynamically. Thus, the simulator for 
chair can construct many simulations of different chairs, from different per-
spectives, used for different purposes, reflecting the agent’s current goal and 
situation.”55 Running the model on hypothetical data, in fact, simulates experi-
ence, engaging versions of our actual sensory experiences and triggering affec-
tive reactions.56 
Of course, the models we maintain are flawed, may be inconsistent with 
one another, and exist at many scales: 
Peoples’ ability to represent the world accurately, however, is always lim-
ited and unique to each individual. Mental models are therefore character-
ized as incomplete representations of reality. They are also regarded as 
 
 50.  KENNETH CRAIK, THE NATURE OF EXPLANATION 51–61 (1943). 
 51.  P.N. Johnson-Laird, Causation, Mental Models, and the Law, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 67, 70 (1999). 
 52.  Stefan N. Groesser & Martin Schaffernicht, Mental Models of Dynamic Systems: Taking Stock and 
Looking Ahead, 28 SYST. DYNAMICS REV. 46, 48 (2012). 
 53.  Natalie A. Jones et al., Mental Models: An Interdisciplinary Synthesis of Theory and Methods, 16 
ECOLOGY & SOC’Y 46, 49 (2011). 
 54. Lawrence W. Barsalou, The Human Conceptual System, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF 
PSYCHOLINGUISTICS 239 (Michael Spivey, Ken McRae & Marc Joanisse eds., 2012). 
 55.  Id. at 251. 
 56.  See, e.g., Lawrence W. Barsalou, Situated Conceptualization: Theory and Applications, in 1 
FOUNDATIONS OF EMBODIED COGNITION: PERCEPTUAL AND EMOTIONAL EMBODIMENT 12–13 (Yann Coello & 
Martin H. Fischer eds., 2016) (contrasting the “sandwich model,” which finds cognition as a modular process 
existing in the brain between perception and action, with “grounded cognition,” which views cognition as in-
separable from sensory perceptions and physical action). 
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inconsistent representations because they are context-dependant and may 
change according to the situation in which they are used. In essence, men-
tal models have to be highly dynamical models to adapt to continually 
changing circumstances and to evolve over time through learning. Con-
ceptualizing cognitive representations as dynamic, inaccurate models of 
complex systems acknowledges the limitations in peoples’ ability to con-
ceive such complex systems.57 
Further, people think in terms of analogies, meaning that mental models 
are “analogous representations” and not just convenient translations of abstract 
thought processes for purposes of communicating.58 
There is no reason to suspect that our understanding of law manifests and 
operates differently than does our understanding of anything else we experi-
ence. As Lynn Lopucki has written: 
When law is applied, it is always through the agency of a human mind. 
That mind must absorb both the law and the situation to which it is to be 
applied, represent them internally, make the application, and report the 
results. It is mental representations—referred to in the cognitive psychol-
ogy literature as “mental models”—not written law, by which lawyers 
and judges process cases. They can and sometimes do describe the law 
contained in their mental models in speech and in writing. The law in 
those models is remarkably simple, virtually black letter. That simplicity 
embarrasses the lawyers and judges. When pressed on a point, they are 
likely to scramble for a book or offer to prepare a memorandum.59 
When we say that one has an understanding of a group’s law, we mean, 
necessarily, that he or she has a satisfactory mental model of its practice. To 
talk about a complex social practice is, if one looks closely enough, to describe 
the scarcely even countable number of interactions of many trillions of atoms.60 
A model, in the sense of mathematics or the natural sciences, is a toy universe, 
a game with a small number of pieces and rules, the playing of which may 
 
 57. Jones et al., supra note 53, at 46–47 (2011). 
 58.  Id. at 48. Sociologists have long observed that interaction, cooperation, and description are only pos-
sible on account of abstraction. See, e.g., Floyd N. House, Social Relations and Social Interaction, 31 AM. J. 
SOC. 617, 630 (1926). 
We are able to deal with this concrete reality, however, in a more or less sophisticated and purposive way, 
by categorizing it, that is by subjecting it to a procedure of conscious or unconscious abstraction. . . . 
[T]he most natural kind of abstractions which we make from the reality of experience are probably those 
in which we reduce the reality to a substantive form . . . . 
Id.; cf. MAX WEBER, ON THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 91–94 (1949). 
In its conceptual purity, [the ideal type] cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality. It is a Utopia. 
Historical research faces the task of determining in each individual case, the extent to which this ideal-
construct approximates to or diverges from reality. . . . [Ideal types] appear in full conceptual integrity ei-
ther not at all or only in individual instances. Here as elsewhere every concept which is not purely classi-
ficatory diverges from reality. But the discursive nature of our knowledge, i.e., the fact that we compre-
hend reality only through a chain of intellectual modifications postulates such a conceptual short-hand. 
WEBER, supra. 
 59.  Lynn M. LoPucki, Legal Culture, Legal Strategy, and the Law in Lawyers’ Heads, 90 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1498, 1500 (1996). 
 60.  Even to narrate reality as the evolution of positions and energies of atoms is to speak within the 
bounds of a particular model. Atoms, themselves, are high-level constructs. 
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analogize well or poorly to the features of reality in which one is truly interest-
ed.61 A metal rod across which heat is conducted may be described as a one-
dimensional continuum, each point possessing a finite number of qualities, like 
heat energy and density. A group of ranchers on an open rangeland may be de-
scribed as calculating machines with maximization goals, the rangeland basi-
cally a resource equivalent to a number, and the ranchers’ actions still other 
numbers with fixed relationships to the rangeland’s numbers.62 A volcano is 
modeled with clay, baking soda, and vinegar. The science fair participant’s atti-
tude toward this tabletop construction is driven by the small number of features 
of the actual volcano he or she believes salient in producing the phenomena as-
sociated with it that are of interest at the time. 
It might only be a difference in rhetorical emphasis, but I focus on the 
language of models and their objects instead of the language of concepts. It is 
not so much that the notion of concept is too cramped, but, rather, the opposite. 
Its very generality pushes us perhaps to worry too much about legal partici-
pants’ failure to share a single concept of law. The language of modeling is 
more constrained, more suggestive of the adaptability of a mindset to the par-
ticular problem in front of it. In the modeling theory of legal systems, there is 
simply the perceived fact of cooperation, and the human perceivers build mod-
els of that cooperation, both as they perceive it and as they wish it to be. They 
judge the cooperation based on these models, and they negotiate and argue for 
modifications, rejections, and acceptance of models. Modeling, unlike inquiring 
into a concept, is obviously to perceive, to simplify, and to approximate.63 
Viewing law as the cooperation of modeling agents also seems to fit what 
we observe about legal argumentation. It accounts—as may already be obvious 
but as we will see below—for basic, theoretical disagreement and, yet, is 
grounded in empirical fact. 
 
 61.  See, e.g., R.I.G. Hughes, Models and Representation, 64 PHIL. SCI. S325, S325–36 (Supp. 1997). 
Hughes nicely describes the process and use of the modeling of physical reality as a composition of denotation, 
demonstration, and interpretation. Id. at S327–29. 
A mathematical representation should not be thought of simply as an idealization or an abstraction. Like 
an analogical representation, it presents us with a secondary subject that has, so to speak, a life of its own. 
In other words, the representation has an internal dynamic whose effects we can examine. From the be-
havior of the model we can draw hypothetical conclusions about the world over and above the data we 
started with. 
Id. at S331. It is no accident that so many philosophers of law have been drawn to the rules of games as analo-
gies. See, e.g., HART, supra note 10, at 142–45. The only mistake in so doing, as I will argue, is failing to rec-
ognize that the playing of games is more than just analogous to conducting a legal regime, it is conducting a 
legal regime. 
 62.  See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244–45 (1968). 
 63.  This thesis concerning our subjective experience of law is consistent with emerging theories of the 
human conceptual system. 
Rather than being a single abstracted representation for a category, a concept is a skill for constructing id-
iosyncratic representations tailored to the current needs of situated action. . . . Barsalou . . . proposes the 
construct of a simulator as a distributed neural mechanism that constructs an infinite set of specific simu-
lations to represent a category . . . dynamically. 
Barsalou, The Human Conceptual System, supra note 54, at 251. 
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B. Mental Models and Object-Orientation 
Whatever the fundamental, ontological status of, say, a cathedral and 
whatever one might believe to be the nature of the physical reality of the uni-
verse, when it comes to our cooperation with respect to the cathedral, it certain-
ly must be understood as consisting of our thoughts about it. We talk to one an-
other concerning the models we maintain about the cathedral, models that must 
ignore and obscure the irrelevant and highlight the salient, where irrelevance 
and salience depend on the point of our cooperation at the moment. When we 
talk of doorways, pews, and altars rather than stone, wood, and metal, it is be-
cause we are able to cooperate by coordinating our models to solve the prob-
lems in front of us. 
The more complex the system, the more obvious is our inevitable resort to 
what computer programmers call “object-oriented design.”64 One example that 
leads to particularly quick understanding of the power of this modeling lan-
guage is the simple clock.65 
A clock hides its complicated machinery behind a simple face. As an ob-
ject, it exposes to the user an interface of very simple informational compo-
nents. You can “ask” the clock what time it is and read the response by looking 
at its hands. To answer your question, the clock must engage in complex pro-
cessing, but it hides all of that from the user. If someone invented a better way 
to produce answers to the “what time is it?” question (a better internal mecha-
nism), the internals could be replaced, but the user interface could remain ex-
actly the same. 
To solve practical problems in ways human beings can understand, series 
of complex events and long lists of granular instructions can be replaced by a 
relatively small network of message-passing objects, each object responsive to 
a small number of discrete queries. The immensity of the time-keeping problem 
can be hidden, conveying to the watch’s wearer the singular piece of infor-
mation that may interest her: the time. 
Within the watch, we can find springs and gears and mechanisms, even as 
we could look yet more closely and describe more and more detailed material 
components. Perhaps the makers of one component have no idea how to manu-
facture another or even how the other components work. All that is necessary, 
though, for their participation in the cooperative enterprise of watch manufac-
ture is to know the discrete details concerning how the parts relevant to their 
component will function when acted upon—acted upon in one of the discrete 
ways that each part is designed to act. Your mechanism, for example, must re-
 
 64.  See, e.g., William Li, Pablo Azar, David Larochelle, Phil Hill & Andrew W. Lo, Law Is Code: A 
Software Engineering Approach to Analyzing the United States Code, 10 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 297, 313–14 
(2015) (describing object-oriented software design). 
 65.  My initial education on object-oriented design was a much older version of these documents. Object-
Oriented Programming with Objective C, APPLE DEVELOPER, 
https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Cocoa/Conceptual/OOP_ObjC/Introduction/Introdu
ction.html (last updated Nov. 15, 2010). I have borrowed the clock example from the explanation contained in 
these documents’ predecessor. 
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spond to the constant turning of a motor, and it must translate that energy into a 
heartbeat turning of a gear. How does it do that? The wearer need not know. 
The maker of the battery need not know. The maker of the glass that protects 
the face need not know. Nor do you need to know anything about their work-
ings or purposes other than their interface with your component. 
The important principle is this: We can make a watch together if we mas-
ter the potentially complex construction and details of our own parts and design 
them to communicate simply with the parts made by others. And this we can do 
if we share a simple model of communicating parts. 
Conceiving of a system as composed of simple, communicating objects 
makes intensely intricate tasks possible by hiding substantial amounts of com-
plexity. As Henry Smith and Thomas Merrill have observed in the context of 
property law, bundling complexity inside discrete objects that expose only sim-
ple interfaces saves what would be high costs of interaction were our descrip-
tions of things always in terms of basic components.66 “Property” and “owner-
ship” are such objects, hiding a great many details concerning how such 
statuses might be recognized and lost. The law endeavors, to the extent compat-
ible with other commitments, to “objectize” these terms, to sweep vast clusters 
of event descriptions under these labels, so that in many disputes, we can simp-
ly ask whether there is “property” and then do the things we have determined to 
do when there is or when there is not. We do not need long lists of rules speci-
fying what is to be done when someone takes another’s car, house, food, furni-
ture, paper, computer, etc. The notion of “theft” queries the “property” class of 
objects as a class,67 not a “diamond necklace” object in particular. 
C. Law as Object-Oriented Modeling 
In explaining what law’s practice is, we are necessarily explicating a 
model of idealized parts and rules. Legislatures, attorneys, statutes, adjudica-
tion—no matter how detailed our description of these parts, our use of them in 
explaining the physical reality of law can only be by analogy. And indeed, by 
talking as if the pieces and rules of our hypothetical game are the real things 
themselves, we sometimes elide the possibility that one source of theoretical 
disagreement is the use of different models to describe what those in disagree-
ment are observing—that the actual disagreement is about the right choice of 
model.68 A legal argument operates within a model, proceeding according to its 
 
 66.  See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The 
Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 8 (2000); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Property as Modularity, 
125 HARV. L. REV. 151, 162 (2012); Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691–
98 (2012). 
 67.  In many object-oriented programming languages, classes of objects are themselves objects. See, e.g., 
HAL FULTON WITH ANDRÈ ARKO, THE RUBY WAY 33 (3d ed. 2015). 
 68.  Felix Cohen is famous for his devastating critique of judicial use of unreal constructs, like “corpora-
tion,” as though they have physical substance, obscuring actual reasons for decisions with fake-physical non-
sense. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 821 
(1935). But even Cohen noted that transcendental categories had their utility. “[M]yths may impress the imagi-
nation and memory where more exact discourse would leave minds cold.” Id. at 812. Models, though, are more 
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rules and objects, and, thus, passes over acres of vacant intellectual terrain—the 
unargued, unremarked landscape of reality that the model idealizes. To put it 
concretely, our model tells us what needs to be argued with facts and theory 
and what can be assumed or otherwise ignored. 
That the simplification of concerted activity is central to both law and 
computer science has not gone completely unnoticed by scholars, but neither 
has it been particularly central to legal theory. While some researchers, in vari-
ous fields, have explored the connections between law and computer science,69 
only a few have remarked on that connection as more fundamental than mere 
analogy. Thomas Blackwell, for one, has noted the power of object-oriented 
design in computer programming to facilitate the cooperative creation of highly 
complex applications and argued that such a design paradigm should be applied 
to legislative drafting.70 In the course of asking to what extent the practice of 
law is science, M.C. Roos notes the important roles of abstraction, systematiza-
tion, and reflection that are key to the practice of both.71 What leads Roos to 
 
than myths. They are our reality, not lies we tell ourselves. The sin identified by Cohen was circularity, not the 
fact that all our categories never quite map the world as it is. 
 69.  There is a surprisingly sparse literature on the similarities between legal systems and complex soft-
ware. One line of research, which seems to have been prominent when personal computing was new, is con-
cerned with understanding law in a way that could be reduced to computation. See, e.g., Jon Bing, Legal Rules, 
Discretionary Norms, and Computer Programs, in COMPUTER SCIENCE AND LAW 119, 119–22 (Bryan Niblett 
ed., 1980) (describing the steps of legal decision-making, from legal sources to interpretation to actionable le-
gal norms, and noting the potential for reduction to interpretive compilers); Susan Jones, Control Structure in 
Legislation, in COMPUTER SCIENCE AND LAW 157, 157–67 (Bryan Niblett ed., 1980) (attempting to replicate 
the procedure and substance of an intestate succession statute using the computer language Legol2, focusing on 
control flow structures); Robert Kowalski & Marek Sergot, The Use of Logical Models in Legal Problem Solv-
ing, 3 RATIO JURIS. 201, 201–18 (1990) (suggesting the modeling of law in ways that could be reduced to com-
putation using logic-oriented programming languages and identifying simple applications of law that lend 
themselves to calculation, including aiding in drafting by testing outputs and serving as expert systems for law-
yers to test scenarios of legal application); Herbert Fiedler, Functional Relations Between Legal Regulations 
and Software, in COMPUTER SCIENCE AND LAW 137, 144 (Bryan Niblett ed., 1980). 
It can be hoped that legal theory in general is able to realize that there are important requirements for the 
law analogous to the objectives of programming methodology in its more modern forms. Such require-
ments are, e.g., understandability, modifiability, eventually even something like demonstrability of cor-
rectness of legal regulations with regard to definable tasks. 
Fiedler, supra.  There is, however, some more recent scholarship exploring the analogy, perhaps induced by a 
perceived second-wave of computation in social science, the era of big data. See generally Li et al., supra note 
64. 
 70.  Thomas F. Blackwell, Finally Adding Method to Madness: Applying Principles of Object-Oriented 
Analysis and Design to Legislative Drafting, 3 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 227, 268–87 (2000). Blackwell 
helpfully summarizes the object-oriented design pattern as, first, an analysis phase: 
(1) identification of relevant concepts in the real world; (2) identification of attributes of those concepts; 
(3) identification of relationships between those concepts; and (4) reassembly of those concepts, attrib-
utes, and relationships into a conceptual model that accurately and unambiguously describes the problem 
domain. This conceptual model is then refined through successive iterations until it is complete. 
Id. at 274. This is followed by the design phase, “‘[t]he heart of [which] is the creation of interaction diagrams, 
which illustrate how objects will communicate in order to fulfill the requirements.’” Id.; see also Li et al., supra 
note 64, at 308–10 (noting that object-oriented methodologies in software achieve the goals of abstraction and 
modularity, goals that can and should be pursued in statutory analysis). 
 71.  M.C. Roos, Is Law Science?, 17 POTCHESTROOM ELEC. L.J. 1391, 1417–27 (2014). 
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suggest law is a science is the development in law of an abstract system of ob-
jects and a theory that structurally relates objects to one another.72 
The author closest to the fuller approach advocated here is Garrett Wil-
son, who wrote a truly remarkable, unpublished paper as a law student explor-
ing the deep connection between law and computer code.73 
At a fundamental level, the evolution of the common law and the iterative 
improvement of computer software are based upon some of the same ana-
lytic philosophy concepts developed in the Twentieth Century relating to 
conceptions of reality, linguistics, and set theory. At their heart, both pro-
fessions depend on model creation, model application, and model revising 
or refactoring . . . . While the three year training course that is law school 
tries to help law students develop an intuitive understanding of how law 
“works” and evolves, the software profession is currently ahead of the le-
gal profession in creating procedures and frameworks for identifying 
what makes conceptual models logically elegant; and when and how these 
models should be changed.74 
Wilson nicely suggests a symmetry between the evolution of law and the 
evolution of software. On the one hand, we observe law’s evolution from a 
more procedural orientation (the legal world of writs and forms of action that 
specified more particular law to resolve particularized disputes, walling off are-
as of law that were conceptually similar) to class-orientation (the increased 
mapping of legal concepts to real-world categories and the abolition of fic-
tions). On the other hand, we find software’s evolution from procedural code 
(programs as series of instructions) to object-oriented code (programs that, 
among other things, model reality and contain hierarchies of communicating, 
detail-hiding objects).75 
The uncertainties and controversies arising in our practice of law become 
a little more obvious when we realize that each understanding we have of a le-
gal system is a distinct model consisting of communicating, idealized objects. 
What we know about a legal system at any given moment is a simplification 
and an abstraction in which millions upon millions of real and potential human 
interactions are shepherded into a much smaller number of rules and institu-
tions. We have courts, legislatures, agencies, international bodies, families, 
sports leagues, statutes, regulations, and decisions. We have ideas like causa-
 
 72.  Roos characterizes law as science by arguing for a conception of science that emphasizes behavioral 
elements, rejecting notions that it is defined by its domain of objectivity, that it is identical with the generation 
of falsifiable statements, that it is puzzle-solving, or that it is whatever produces useful knowledge. Id. at 1401–
11. Rather, science is the cognitive function of abstracting the world, systematizing it, and reflecting on the 
system. Id. at 1414. “Abstraction also leads to creative cognitive functioning and the ability to cope with more 
complex tasks or situations.” Id. Roos goes on to explain the distinction between unscientific “entitary” abstrac-
tion (the breaking of perception into abstract parts, like the parts of a cow) and the scientific “modal” abstrac-
tion (the sort that is concerned with the structured relations among objects). Id. at 1417–18. 
 73.  See Garrett Wilson, Refactoring the Law: Reformulating Legal Ontologies (Mar. 16, 2006) (un-
published J.D. writing requirement, University of San Francisco School of Law), 
http://www.garretwilson.com/essays/law/refactoringlaw.html. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Id. 
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tion, defense, lawsuit, property, jurisdiction, statutes, and speech that, depend-
ing on the dispute, we often either observe as being present or absent, and then 
connect that fact directly to other objects and arguments. Sometimes, though, 
we “unpack” and argue about more basic components of these ideas.76 And 
from models that consist of these objects, we “do” the law. We force people in-
to prison, force the payment of money and the delivery of services, and kick 
people out of clubs. We kill people. We stop government agents from spying or 
even require them to spy. We dissolve failed marriages and business partner-
ships. 
At a very low level, but even here not so close to the metal that we can 
dispense with the label “model” and call it “reality,” all of these activities are 
atoms and energy, as with the human body and the clock. What is the practice 
of law? Like the body itself or the working of the clock, the practice of law is 
just patterns of energy and atoms.77 That is certainly true. Law might be de-
scribed completely by physics and mathematics. It certainly could be described 
more precisely in those terms. We do not, however, send our law students 
across the quad to the physics and math departments and call it a day. Not only 
do we not have the power to model legal systems at the level of atoms, it seems 
the wrong level to conceive of our history of cooperation when trying to deter-
mine how that cooperation should proceed.78 
Return for a moment to consider all of the vacant terrain we unthinkingly 
crossed in our earlier discussion of disputes and resolutions. What is a dispute? 
At a very broad level, it consists of certain features of the moments when the 
plans or desires of two humans conflict in such a way that those plans and de-
sires cannot both be fully met, and so cooperation is potentially obstructed. 
However satisfying or unsatisfying that description might seem, it positively 
bleeds imprecision. More precision, though, asks us to define our terms better. 
Okay, then, what is a human? Does this level of precision matter? Could it ever 
 
 76.  Compare Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 18 (1971) (finding words of protest on a jacket to be 
“speech” within the meaning of the First Amendment), with United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–83 
(1968) (distinguishing conduct from speech and focusing on the reasonableness of the government’s regulation 
of the conduct of mutilating a draft card). 
 77.  “Just” is an overly derisive term to describe the majesty of small-scale nature that produces these 
recognizable high-level social systems. 
Is it possible that that ‘thing’ walking back and forth in front of you, talking to you, is a great glob of these 
atoms in a very complex arrangement, such that the sheer complexity of it staggers the imagination as to 
what it can do? When we say we are a pile of atoms, we do not mean we are merely a pile of atoms, be-
cause a pile of atoms which is not repeated from one to the other might well have the possibilities which 
you see before you in the mirror. 
RICHARD P. FEYNMAN, ROBERT B. LEIGHTON & MATTHEW SANDS, THE FEYNMAN LECTURES ON PHYSICS, 
VOL. I: THE NEW MILLENNIUM EDITION: MAINLY MECHANICS, RADIATION, AND HEAT I-9 (2011). 
 78.  See Jones et al., supra note 53. 
A mental model is a simplified representation of reality that allows people to interact with the world. Be-
cause of cognitive limitations, it is neither possible nor desirable to represent every detail that may be 
found in reality. Aspects that are represented are influenced by a person’s goals and motives for construct-
ing the mental model as well as their background knowledge or existing knowledge structures . . . . 
Id. 
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matter, in the sense that competing but reasonable understandings of the con-
cept of a human could lead to different legal conclusions? 
I will not continue down the road of elucidating the manifold concept of a 
human being. My purpose here is not to suggest that all descriptions of law that 
posit the existence of something called a human being are fatally flawed. I will 
take it as given, for example, that we can say, without dispute in most cases, 
what a human being is. I bring it up because it is useful, indeed critical, to ask 
why it is that I am almost always comfortable taking the concept of “human” 
and a host of other concepts for granted. And yet, in a few cases, the apparently 
vacant terrain containing the more particular and competing conceptions of 
“human being” is revealed as vibrant and important. The concept of a human 
being is opened, and disputes about its components are had.79 
If we inevitably traverse under-theorized terrain, perhaps legal under-
standing itself requires us to do so. When we take a concept like “human” for 
granted, declining to go further into its nature, we are using a model of the legal 
system that considers a human being to be a particular kind of physical entity 
that can receive informational inputs and produce behaviors, including informa-
tional outputs in a restricted range (or that at least resembles such an entity in a 
way that leads us to treat it like one that can). While we might, in some cases, 
become interested in how exactly humans do that—how we decide what to do 
based on stimuli—and in how to value their choices and what we call their 
well-being, we will rarely if ever find it useful to construct a model of legal 
systems that conceives of humans at the molecular level but no higher. Humans 
are, from our legal perspective, objects hiding complexity, like the clock’s face 
that we know hides complex springs and gears. 
D. Criteria for Law 
We are now ready to define the phenomenon that is a legal system. It will 
necessarily be in terms of individual models and perceptions of the models of 
others. To repeat: All our conceptions of law are abstract, object-oriented, men-
tal models of a social practice. These models consist of informational networks 
of connected objects. The “true” nature of these objects and their communica-
tions is only modeled, and we hold in our heads an abstract, simplified set of 
rules and tokens that represents the objects’ physical compositions and utter-
ances. Indeed, any sufficiently complex process that we wish to understand and 
discuss must ultimately be reduced to a nonreal, conceptual model of interact-
ing objects. When a person calls a thing “law,” she is engaging in just such a 
process. 
Importantly, none of us maintains a single such model. Our working con-
ception of the legal system depends on the reason we are thinking about it. 
Sometimes, for example, when deciding how to answer a legal question, we 
 
 79.  See, e.g., Kirsten Rabe Smolensky, Defining Life from the Perspective of Death: An Introduction to 
the Forced Symmetry Approach, 2006 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 41, 51–62 (discussing difficult cases raising the ques-
tion of the meaning of “human being”). 
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might ask whether a “legislature” “passed” a “statute.” Whether we need to 
dwell on the nature of each of those terms depends on the question we are ask-
ing and the attitudes of the participants toward that question and those terms. 
Does it matter that the legislature is, in fact, an institution comprising individu-
al people—people who also compose sub-institutions like committees and sep-
arate “chambers” of the legislature?80 Maybe, maybe not. Perhaps we agree on 
what these terms mean for this case (that we are satisfied looking only at the 
hands of the clock), and so we talk about law through the interface exposed by 
this very simple model. Perhaps, though, one of us will not accept this model as 
to this question. Our disagreement might concern what it means to “pass” a 
statute, and we must turn to a more complicated model, one containing springs 
and gears (but still not molecules), that accounts for principles of majoritarian-
ism. We are “doing law” when we can agree to accept another’s use of a model 
to resolve such questions, even if the model leaves room for disagreement 
among us on the right outcome. 
To develop criteria for law, we start with a single individual and measure 
his or her attitudes about an instance of cooperation. I claim that he or she 
maintains a model of the relevant portion of the legal system, one that connects 
questions about the conditions of cooperation with information concerning 
those questions. A more precise language for describing such models in terms 
of institutions and rules will be taken up below. For now, let us focus on what 
we mean by a legal system among a group of people who maintain such mod-
els, however described. 
A locally preferred model is a model of the legal system (concerning an-
ticipated input data) that an individual would prefer to use to answer a question. 
A local actual model is a model of the legal system that an individual uses 
to govern his or her own actions within the legal system. It may or may not be 
his or her locally preferred model.81 
A locally identified model is a model of the legal system (concerning an-
ticipated input data) that the individual believes to be a local actual model of a 
cooperating participant. It is, of course, possible to make a mistake and to iden-
 
 80.  For example, in most cases, our model of the legislative branch may consist only of an abstract entity 
we think of as “The Legislature.” This model was insufficiently detailed for the debate in INS v. Chadha, 462 
U.S. 919, 957–59 (1983) (striking down a statute giving a single House of Congress the authority to veto cer-
tain executive actions). 
 81.  I allow that the actual model can differ from the preferred model for two reasons. First, it is possible 
for a decision-maker to be unprincipled: to prefer that model A be used to answer questions of type under con-
sideration but to use model B for reasons she wishes not to see repeated. A common form of legal disagree-
ment, though perhaps aggressive enough not often to be made explicit, is believing another participant had pre-
viously argued for model A but that only model B can explain her decision now. See, e.g., Zant v. Stephens, 462 
U.S. 862, 910 (1983) (Marshall, J., concurring) (“Today we learn for the first time that the Court did not mean 
what it said in Gregg v. Georgia. We now learn that the actual decision whether a defendant lives or dies may 
still be left to the unfettered discretion of the jury.”).  The other possibility is that the actor is making a subcon-
scious, intuitive decision using one model but would articulate the application of another, reasoned model. Cf. 
Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment, 
108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814, 817–19 (2001) (describing the “social intuitionist model” of moral judgment, in which 
quick intuitive moral decisions are followed by slow, post hoc reasoning). 
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tify a model that another participant is not in fact using. For example, Y locally 
identifies a model used by X as: “X makes decisions according to the rules he 
interprets in the King James Bible.” But X’s actual model is: “I (X) make deci-
sions that make me wealthier so long as they can be plausibly passed off as 
consistent with the King James Bible.” 
Local acceptance occurs when an individual accepts a locally identified 
model, in the sense that the individual prefers continued cooperation in the face 
of behavior by another consistent with the locally identified model. 
Mutual acceptance occurs among participants when they each locally ac-
cept a locally identified model with respect to every other participant. Mutual 
acceptance does not require a single understanding of law. It does not require 
agreement concerning what outputs to produce but, rather, can manifest agree-
ment to disagree. Nor does mutual acceptance even require a coherent external 
description of the members’ agreements and disagreements concerning deci-
sion-making. For example, Participant One identifies model A as being used by 
Participant Two. Participant Two identifies model B as being used by Partici-
pant One. Model A and model B may be incompatible, in the sense that they 
lead to different decisions on many important questions, and, yet, it is possible 
that Participant One accepts Participant Two’s use of A and vice versa. That is 
mutual acceptance but not mutual acceptance of a single model. 
A model is a shared model if every member maintains an identical local 
actual model. Almost inevitably, shared models exist, if at all, at a high level of 
abstraction. But there need not be a single, shared model at all. The cooperation 
may proceed by universal toleration or mistake rather than agreement. Whether 
the legal system is stable, in the sense that the cooperation is likely to continue, 
could depend on the paucity of such mistakes, especially if decisions that will 
reveal the mistakes arise. 
Hart identifies a legal system with the fact that there exists some shared 
model among officials (the rule of recognition) and mutual acceptance of the 
more detailed models of a legal system within a group.82 This fact is social, not 
logical or moral, in nature in that it describes a contingent condition among a 
particular group of human beings at a particular time. Having a shared model is 
accepting a potentially complex ultimate rule of recognition from the internal 
point of view: according to an attitude favoring continued cooperation con-
sistent with the accepted model. The model is, consistent with Hart’s under-
standing, a guide for conduct, and it provides grounds for criticizing behavior 
departing from it, flagging departure from the model as a departure from the 
cooperation more generally.83 Thus, the legal system gathers to itself the moral 
 
 82.  See, e.g., HART, supra note 10, at 116–17 (setting out as a criterion for a legal system that “its rules 
of recognition specifying the criteria of legal validity and its rules of change and adjudication must be effective-
ly accepted as common public standards of official behaviour by its officials”). Of course, we might judge the 
set of accepted models on other grounds, including scientifically. If the accepted models all proceed from basic 
assumptions that the universe is fundamentally made of milk, ash, and fire, one can judge that these models are 
a poor fit to our lived reality, as revealed by science. But accuracy is not what we are observing when we iden-
tify, as opposed to judge, law. 
 83.  Id. at 117. 
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force of the underlying ties that bind the group whose cooperation is the law, 
however weak or strong that force might be. 
For example, suppose participants share a single model that decisions of 
the group shall be those favored by a majority of the group, where each mem-
ber’s expressed preference shall be based on his or her assessment of what is 
best for the group as a whole.84 While they maintain disparate models of greater 
detail for reaching decisions, having among them different reasons for conclud-
ing one or another result is “best,” they each locally accept such models for de-
termining what is best that they locally identify as used by others. For several 
decisions, this appears to work, and members in the minority accept results that 
go against their more detailed locally preferred models. Attempts to carry into 
effect decisions reached only by a minority or to block decisions reached by a 
majority could be criticized as “illegal,” because they are clearly contrary to the 
shared model. Indeed, participants expect such efforts would be so criticized. 
But now suppose a new circumstance arises, perhaps a decision whether 
to construct a building. The building would disproportionately advantage one 
member of the group. This member announces he is voting for construction be-
cause he is the most important member of the group and that what is best for 
him is necessarily best for the group. The other members had accepted that 
members might disagree concerning what is best for the group, and they had 
mutually accepted a model of decision-making that would bind them to deci-
sions contrary to their own views. But, reflecting on this new occurrence, each 
member reconsiders the minimal decision-making models he or she accepts and 
concludes that “an assessment of what is best for the group” implies an equality 
principle and that a model of reasons that takes no account of such a principle 
is unacceptable. 
What the selfish member has done is not down to theoretical disagreement 
concerning the grounds of the group’s decision-making. Disagreement was 
contemplated and expected, indeed inevitable. No, his actions are contrary to an 
acceptable understanding of the grounds of the group’s cooperation—that min-
imal shared model they had believed they maintained. In light of this new expe-
rience, the members realize that the selfish member has violated a mutually ac-
cepted model of cooperation, because that model requires that no member’s 
interests be treated as any more important than those of any other member. 
While this principle would not rule out decisions that confer special advantages 
or disadvantages, such decisions may not be grounded in reasons that identify 
some members as inherently more important than others. 
This may sound imprecise, and that is precisely the point. The members 
are refining the terms of their cooperation, as they must. They cannot do the 
impossible and set out for all time the structures of reasoning and processing 
they will find acceptable in the future. There is no ultimate when it comes to 
reasons for decisions. All attitudes of acceptance are attitudes and, thus, defea-
 
 84.  Note the obvious lack of determinacy here. A more detailed model might specify how best interests 
are to be determined. The point is that the group has mutually accepted a model under which people might dif-
fer on that question. 
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sible. That being so, the validity of the things accepted is defeasible.85 Ac-
ceptance of a model depends on the scope of imagination one brings to its anal-
ysis. New uses of the model may reveal deficiencies of imagination and be-
come cause for rejecting what was once accepted. 
The basic mechanic of cooperation—each participant’s accepting the lo-
cally identified models as they would apply to prevailing and anticipated cir-
cumstances—will appear more concrete once we develop a common language 
for describing such models and their constituent parts.86 But the legal system of 
a cooperative group can usually be identified as some model of the group’s 
practice shared by its participants.87 It is necessarily indeterminate because the 
model does not and cannot contain all the reasons that would be required to re-
solve all future cases. But it must contain, at least, an agreement to accept po-
tential disagreement about such things—that being the essence of acceptance of 
an incomplete, locally identified model. Indeed, the evolution of the legal sys-
tem will likely be toward the most detailed models shared by those participants 
with power under the rules as defined in a more abstract, accepted model. 
This short discussion of basic definitions may have obscured the fact that 
legal systems operate not within a singular group of individuals that reaches 
discrete decisions but among cooperating and conflicting subgroups, affiliated 
with one another at various levels of remove. A key observation, though, is that 
the global definitions we have described and the mechanisms of cooperation so 
far discussed are fractal; when you examine the workings of one of its parts, 
you find the same structure that characterized its whole. The global system is a 
union of communicating institutions. Each of those institutions can itself be 
viewed as a legal system. And these institutions are themselves unions of legal 
systems, all the way down to the warring components of a single individual’s 
mind.88 Describing a model of a legal system, then, is to describe models of in-
stitutions and the communications between them. We can speak with more pre-
cision if we can describe a template for such legal models, which is precisely 
the role of the institutions and information theory to which I turn next. 
 
 85.  For an interesting, short review of defeasibility in law to which the theory advanced here is congen-
ial, see Bartosz Brozek, Law and Defeasibility, 23 REVUS 165, 169 (2014) (“Defeasibility is a formal mecha-
nism which may—but also may not—be used to model legal phenomena.”). 
 86.  See infra Part IV. 
 87.  An exception is mutual mistake where there is no acceptable common denominator. Hart would, 
again, not recognize such a mistaken cooperation as a legal system, there being no acceptance of a single rule 
of recognition from the internal point of view. HART, supra note 10, at 116 (arguing a legal system exists only 
if “rules of recognition specifying the criteria of legal validity and its rules of change and adjudication [are] 
effectively accepted as common public standards of official behaviour by its officials”). The language of mod-
eling permits us to understand the phenomenon of cooperation even without a unifying rule. 
 88.  The human experience of a unified mind at the individual level is a product of evolution that could be 
otherwise. See, e.g., PETER GODFREY-SMITH, OTHER MINDS: THE OCTOPUS, THE SEA, AND THE DEEP ORIGINS 
OF CONSCIOUSNESS 85–87 (2016) (discussing the divided intelligences humans exhibit after surgery severing 
the brain’s corpus callosum, the connection between the left and right hemispheres). 
To some degree, unity is inevitable in a living agent: an animal is a whole, a physical object keeping itself 
alive. But in other ways, unity is optional, an achievement, an invention. Bringing experience together—
even the deliverances of the two eyes—is something that evolution may or may not do. 
Id. at 87. So too, a group’s apparent unity is a contingent product of its history and practices. 
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Such a template will help to show, for example, how there can be a shared 
model of institutional functioning among participants in an institution but, per-
haps, conflicting models (even at the most basic level) between participants in 
different institutions. Whether such local acceptance but global conflict results 
in a breakdown of the legal system depends on the extent to which institutional 
outputs are so unacceptable to members of the institutions that cooperation be-
tween institutions fails. 
IV. THE INSTITUTIONAL REPRESENTATION 
To study law is, again, to study the conceptual side of cooperation among 
a group. Because all understandings of cooperation are models, it is useful to 
create a generic scheme for representing such models. Is there a blueprint of 
sorts that can be used to describe most or perhaps even all legal models, one 
that must obviously be flexible but also illuminating? I propose here a template 
for models of the information-exchanging, decision-making institutions that 
compose legal systems. 
A. The General Model of Information Flow Through a Decision-Making 
Entity 
I begin with a general model of causation by decision-making agents. The 
model charts information flow, from source to action, making it easier to un-
derstand the various methods of regulating human activity. It reveals. 
Decision-making agents receive information, process it, think about 
things, make decisions, and then engage in actions for which they have the nec-
essary instrumentalities. Such actions might be further communication, or they 
might be noncommunicative actions. These are the discrete steps in the chain of 
human causation, each of which could be a potential target of regulation or in-
fluence. 
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FIGURE 1 
 
The basic assumptions here are as follows: 
1. There is a physical source that produces data. This source could be a 
human acting intentionally or a nonintentional physical phenomenon. 
2. The information produced by the source reaches the agent’s senses. 
3. The agent processes the information, transforming the data into mental 
representations that are integrated into the many trees of beliefs, rea-
sons, and ideas the agent maintains. 
4. Ideas may lead to actions if the instrumentalities necessary for such ac-
tions are available. 
5. Actions cause effects.89 
We have a special case of this general pattern when the output (the effect) 
is the transfer of information to another entity. In such a case, the instrumentali-
ty is the means of information transmission, like a piece of paper and a pen or a 
messaging application and infrastructure, and the effect is the delivery of in-
formation. We have: 
  
 
 89. The basic approach here is similar to that taken by Corey Yung in an insightful and illuminating arti-
cle on information theory applied to constitutional interpretation. Corey Rayburn Yung, Constitutional Com-
munication, 96 B.U. L. REV. 303, 311–14 (2016). The shortcomings he observes in the basic model of infor-
mation leads him to integrate context and subtext, an account of which reveals relations among various of the 
dominant schools of constitutional interpretation. Id. at 332–39. I will adopt a similar complication of this basic 
model, observing that a decision-making institution must choose among relevant information sources and it 
does so cooperatively in a manner that is modeled by its participants—and, thus, in a way that is part of the 
institution’s internal law. 
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FIGURE 2 
 
The more detailed model is useful because it reminds us of all the points 
at which we might endeavor to affect the process of understanding and trans-
mission: 
1. Sources of information. 
2. The conveyed informational input (acted upon by disrupting or con-
veying other information, whether metadata or information otherwise 
supportive of or critical of the informational inputs). 
3. Human (or entity-wide) processing of informational inputs (among 
other things filtering available inputs for relevance, combining inputs 
with beliefs, reasoning, weighing, and the construction of new ideas). 
4. The instrumentalities of action (acted upon perhaps by rules affecting 
the availability and uses of instrumentalities). 
5. The actions themselves (acted upon by rules directly requiring, permit-
ting, prohibiting, encouraging, discouraging, or otherwise influencing 
“effects”). 
This general description of information flow helps us to see the omnipres-
ence of information flow in any system of regulation.90 For example, if the bad 
outcomes that concern us are inefficient contracts, the description encourages 
us to look along the chain of action, mindfully choosing whether to interrupt or 
redirect the information leading to the entering of such contracts to supplement 
such information, to make it more difficult to complete such contracts, or simp-
ly not to enforce them. 
A legal effect, like any other effect mediated by a decision-making entity, 
can be modeled by this causal flow model. Source, information, ideation, in-
 
 90.  Knowledge is an unusual good on account of its being, among other things, “sticky” (not practically 
capable of reallocation), nonrival, and nonexcludable. The regulation of knowledge is, for these and other rea-
sons, an emerging, fascinating, and complex field that also subsumes some other, more longstanding under-
standings of regulation. See generally James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of 
the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33 (2003). 
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strumentality, and effect.91 A legislature, for example, receives information 
from multiple sources, deliberates, and produces further information. That in-
formation is itself an input into the decision-making of other legal institutions. 
To have a model of a legal system is, partly, to have a model of the relevant in-
stitutions and how information flows among them. 
Suppose we have a society in which a tyrannical emperor Rex makes eve-
ry decision.92 Here is a possible model of its legal system: 
 
FIGURE 3 
 
 
 
And here is what I call the “Schoolhouse Rock” model of the United 
States’ legal system:93 
FIGURE 4 
 
This is not the only possible model. In fact, we may find it totally inade-
quate to answer pressing questions concerning the law. What if there is a ques-
tion of whether the President signed the bill so that we must contain infor-
mation from the Executive institution to reach a decision? Is a statute valid if 
 
 91.  This model adopts in the legal context many ideas of what political scientists have called Discursive 
Institutionalism. See Schmidt, supra note 8, at 313–17 (distinguishing the school from the rational-actor-
focused new institutionalism as well as historical and norm-based approaches). Here, we have a picture of dis-
coursing agents, constantly building and sharing ideas in a pool of inter- and intra-institutional communication. 
 92.  Here, of course, I refer to the simple example of authority debated by Hart, Fuller, and others. See 
FULLER, supra note 18, at 33–41; HART, supra note 10, at 52–53. 
 93.  See, e.g., Three Ring Government, SCHOOLHOUSE ROCK, 
http://www.schoolhouserock.tv/ThreeRing.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2018). It is a depressing consequence of 
aging that “Schoolhouse Rock” must be cited, so look to this link if the Saturday-morning standby of the 1970s 
and 1980s does not immediately leap to mind. 
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the President signs a bill only passed by the House but not the Senate? What if 
the House and Senate pass slightly different versions of a bill? If I believe in 
the authority of “the Constitution,” there may be some questions upon which 
the set of information produced by the House and the set of information pro-
duced by the Senate are both critical. In those cases, a locally acceptable model 
of the legal system will have to take account of both institutions. And so, such 
model will at least contain the following schematic: 
FIGURE 5 
 
We could offer further refinements, adding administrative agencies, legis-
lative committees, expert witnesses, juries, and more. There simply is no “true” 
model that is not all of reality itself. Rather, my attitude toward cooperation 
will follow from my acceptance or not of an idealized model, which takes ac-
count of a small set of institutions communicating in certain ways.94 
The important observation here is that legal institutions operate this 
way—that they receive input data, process it according to internal rules, and 
produce output data. The participants in this information network operate on 
the basis of models they maintain of this network, including models that inform 
their own processing.95 
But we do not yet have enough content in these schematic models to un-
derstand the attitudes that people maintain about legal systems. These models 
contain only institutions and connecting pathways, like a diagram of a comput-
er that contains only a schematic of chips and connections but no description of 
the logic of each processing unit. Such descriptions tell us only a little about 
 
 94.  More detailed and differently focused models will be deployed depending on the questions under 
consideration. Just as with the rest of our perceptible world, models come online to deal with the reality con-
cerning us at the moment. See supra Section III.A. 
 95.  This “law as modeling of networks of decision making institutions” theory has much in common 
with the fascinating psychological model of judging advanced by Dan Simon: “The theoretical core of the sug-
gested model is as follows: legal questions are cognitively represented as connectionist networks, in which the 
relevant facts, concepts, principles and vying outcomes are all interconnected by means of inferences.” Dan 
Simon, A Psychological Model of Judicial Decision Making, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 122 (1998). 
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how a system works. For more, we need to delve inside institutions and devel-
op a language that describes models of their decision-making. 
B. Modeling Reasoning 
Let us take again the simple model of the legal system of the tyrant Rex. 
Before him, all disputes are brought, and by him, all resolutions made accord-
ing to his then-prevailing will. To understand the legal system of this public, 
we might model the institutions of the disputing parties, conveying information 
to the institution Rex, who then conveys information concerning resolutions to 
those who carry out his orders. In diagram form: 
FIGURE 6 
 
Note that this simple model answers some questions one might have con-
cerning the law of Imperium Rexum. It may be the model I consult when ask-
ing myself who resolves disputes in the empire. When I think of what I should 
do when I have a disagreement with a fellow subject, I know that I must bring 
the dispute before Rex if I want a resolution that invokes the coercive tools of 
the empire itself. Other questions, though, are not answered by this model. 
What is Rex likely to do with my dispute? What should I argue to Rex? How 
should I express my argument? 
To describe more fully the law of the state of Imperium Rexum, we must 
refine this model to describe its institutions’ processing of informational inputs 
into informational outputs. The diagram above describes the flow of legally rel-
evant information, but it does not explain, other than superficially, what the law 
of this jurisdiction is. Far from understanding the potential sources of theoreti-
cal disagreement within the empire or the moral principles to which it adheres, 
we do not know from this model what the outcome of any particular case is 
likely to be. Nor do we even know what information Rex will consult and to 
which he will apply the reasons he maintains for his dispositions. The model is 
a bit too normatively inert for most questions we might have. 
What we seek is a description of the manner in which an institution con-
nects inputs to outputs, which, in the case of human beings, consists of what we 
can simply define as “reasons.” To model cooperation is to generate a simulat-
ing mechanism to stand in for the decision-making agents with whom one is 
cooperating. One needs to model their reasoning. It is this capacity for intellec-
tual empathy that makes legal systems possible. 
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Let us call an institution-information model of a legal system a collection 
of institutions, a schematic of the informational connections between legal in-
stitutions, and, for each institution, a set of reasons that connect informational 
inputs to outputs. This is a schematic of the social software on which the socie-
ty runs. 
These institutional reason sets are not necessarily disaggregated or inte-
grated statements of logic. Nor must they necessarily cohere. For example, the 
logic of the Rex institution in the above model could be the following: 
Root 1: Rex’s currently prevailing desire controls his output. 
Branch 1: Rex desires to rule for plaintiffs on days other than those with 
new moons. 
Further: Rex is correct concerning the phase of the moon with a probability 
of 80%. 
Branch 2: Rex desires to rule for defendants at all other times. 
Root 2: Rex rules for people with brown hair. 
Further: Rex notices hair color 60% of the time and is guided by moon 
phase 40% of the time. 
Note, too, that we could assemble Rex’s reasons into hierarchical trees of 
reasons and that Rex might maintain incompatible trees. Rex’s computational 
character can then be described, whether accurately or not, by a set of reason 
trees. Using the model, we examine an input, apply the set of reason trees, and 
draw conclusions concerning the outputs Rex will produce. And we can decide, 
if we identify this as Rex’s model, whether to accept it. 
FIGURE 7 
 
This reason tree could also be considered the internally managed set of 
secondary rules that control Rex’s informational output, which we could call 
the primary rules relative to Rex. Under this model, Hart’s conception of law is 
a special case in which the legal system is described, conceptually, as a single 
institution. Its reason tree is the set of secondary rules, terminating in the em-
bedding of the content of the ultimate rule of recognition in the following rea-
son: “Legal actors must produce information consistent with the conventionally 
followed ultimate rule of recognition.” Alternatively, we could describe Hart’s 
concept of law as a fixed network of information-exchanging institutions that 
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all contain the same DNA, the chain of rules terminating in the ultimate rule of 
recognition. 
FIGURE 8 
 
The information and institutions model generalizes Hart’s model, because 
it understands legal systems as connected institutions that each maintain their 
own reason trees and, thus, their own ultimate rules of recognition, the lowest-
level models at which there is mutual acceptance. This permits us to see more 
deeply the connection between formally separate legal systems, the influence of 
pluralism, the nature of constitutional crises, and the role of claims to authority. 
Institutions can be perceived and may possess a self-concept as connected to 
other institutions, authoritative over other institutions, or members of a “sys-
tem” of legal institutions.96 These connections, though, are inferred from mod-
els of the institution’s reasons, in particular the manner in which and whether it 
takes account of information generated by other institutions. So systematicity 
arises from the ground-up modeling of roles by institutional participants, rather 
than flowing from a definition of law as necessarily implying a unifying, single 
rule of recognition on all the institutions in a presupposed system. We will ex-
amine this idea of “system perception” in more detail in the next Part. 
 
 96.  The ground-up notion of institutional structure, rooted in perception and ideation, is similar to the 
perspective of Discursive Institutionalists. 
DI simultaneously treats institutions as given (as the context within which agents think, speak, and act) 
and as contingent (as the results of agents’ thoughts, words, and actions). The institutions are therefore in-
ternal to the actors, serving both as structures that constrain actors and as constructs created and changed 
by those actors. 
Schmidt, supra note 8, at 314. 
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Let us now consider an example, the case of the United States, and draw 
up a model of its legal system. Many writers seem to assume that the ultimate 
rule of recognition in the United States is the Constitution and that, following 
Hart, the institutions and rules of validity can all be derived from that rule and 
later actions approved under it.97 This seems incorrect under Hart’s theory. Ra-
ther, the ultimate rule must be prior to the document, which, after all, is only a 
datum. It must be something along the lines of: “The content of the Constitu-
tion is binding on all legal actors.”98 That does indeed seem to be the social rule 
that is accepted as a matter of convention by courts, legislators, and executives. 
There is radical disagreement, however, among legal actors concerning the 
meaning of the Constitution. If the Constitution itself were the ultimate rule, 
then it would be impossible for people to disagree concerning its content and 
yet identify it as specifying a conventionally followed social rule through its 
content.99 After all, without agreement, the content would not be conventional-
ly followed. The modeling theory helps us to see that cooperation can exist 
based on the contingent social fact of acceptance of models of cooperation, 
even without specifying an ultimate rule in minute detail or even a rule that is 
coherent in all its possible applications. That there are serious objections to an 
ultimate rule does not negate the fact that participants have mutually accepted it 
at a high level, with those objections perhaps one day disrupting the coopera-
tion if the right input data reveals problems. 
A picture of the institutions-and-information model looks quite different 
from Hart’s model, even though the theory maintains his core ideas: 
 
 97.  See, e.g., HART, supra note 10, at 106 (“[In the United States], there is no legally unlimited legisla-
ture, even in the widest interpretation of ‘legislature’; but the system of course contains an ultimate rule of 
recognition and, in the clauses of its constitution, a supreme criterion of validity.”). Stephen Carey has sur-
veyed and added to much more sophisticated attempts to identify the rule of recognition in the United States, in 
ways that map the debates among exclusive and inclusive legal positivists. Stephen V. Carey, What Is the Rule 
of Recognition in the United States?, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1161, 1175–83 (2009) (analyzing Kent Greenawalt’s 
theory of a hierarchical rule, which contains content solely arising from the Constitution and content defining 
basic authority of the states not arising from the Constitution, and Kenneth Himma’s theory of the rule as iden-
tifying validity with the interpretations of the Constitution by the Supreme Court it deems “morally best”). Car-
ey proposes a more complex and inclusive positivist version of the rule that derives from the strengths of earlier 
efforts. Id. at 1192–94. A more careful dive into these debates and their fit with the modeling theory will have 
to be left to future work. 
 98.  Perhaps the Supremacy Clause states the ultimate rule, self-referentially declaring the document con-
taining it to be the supreme law. See U.S. CONST. art. VI. I would still argue that the ultimate rule is the fact 
that the clause is followed. That is, the ultimate ground for criticizing an official for departing from the content 
of the Constitution is that he or she has violated an obligation to be bound by the content of the Constitution, 
not that he or she violated the Constitution. 
 99.  This is the essence of Dworkin’s criticism of Hart’s positivism, that it cannot account for theoretical 
disagreement about the identification of law. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 9, at 3–7. As my theory shows, 
this criticism fails because it does not account for the fact that agreements to cooperate do not necessarily entail 
agreements to agree on output. Agreements to cooperate are captured by acceptance of higher-level models 
(say that the Constitution controls and its meaning is determined by the majority vote of the Supreme Court) 
and are possible even in the face of strong disagreement concerning the proper form of lower-level models 
(that, for example, the Constitution’s meaning is governed by the reasons of another institution, say the Framers 
as they gave those reasons to their principals, which reasons can be uncovered by references to contemporane-
ous dictionaries and the texts they wrote). 
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FIGURE 9 
 
Right away, without thinking more about what it means to assert such a 
model, we see that this approach allows us to take account of warring second-
ary rules and dynamically to model at least some theoretical disputes over time. 
The Supreme Court and Congress could be operating under separate reason 
trees that take different views of the meanings and authoritativeness of con-
gressional data or even the relevance of various other institutions. 
We also see that an institution’s reasons (or secondary rules) could follow 
entirely from the commands of other institutions, be influenced by other institu-
tion’s data, or be independent. There may be some institutions whose pro-
cessing is so constrained by the output of other institutions that we feel they are 
unnecessary even to consider in a model of the legal system. Perhaps, depend-
ing on a system’s rules, in jailors, we find an institution that issues commands 
(at least, those commands we are interested in modeling) that are completely 
determined by the output of courts. If this is so, then we can understand the le-
gal processes that include them without modeling them as independent institu-
tions and sources of information. Our mental model can omit them if our ques-
tions do not go to any matter on which their reasoning could have an effect. 
But this observation also points the way to a difficulty and an opportunity. 
It is true that we do not normally account for the independent decisions of jail-
ers in our mental models of legal systems. Are such decisions completely con-
strained? An entire genre of legal scholarship is driven by what we might call 
the identification of the missing institution. The basic claim of such an effort is 
that an important class of questions about the legal system cannot be answered 
without including the missing institution into the model. Indeed, the “School-
house Rock” model does not include administrative agencies. While we might 
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be able to answer some legal questions without such institutions, other ques-
tions will be unanswerable without taking account of them.100 
And so, we are reminded that all our models are approximations of an on-
going social practice. Like all models, they are attempts to capture important 
features of some reality in order to answer particular questions. Does this 
fact—that no legal system model we generate is entirely descriptive of “the re-
al” legal system—mean that the information and institutions theory of legal 
systems fails? No, it means only that instances of modeling are incomplete. But 
such models are, I claim, integral to a correct understanding of the social prac-
tice that is law. My thesis is that we generate models of cooperation on de-
mand, at different scales, and from different perspectives. 
Some of the long-burning questions of jurisprudence are answered by 
what we have observed so far—for example, the connection between law and 
morality, the nondistinction between legal and nonlegal cooperative systems, 
and the possibility of theoretical disagreement even if law can be identified as 
arising from social facts alone. We will take an initial but more systematic look 
at those questions in Part V, but it will help if we first examine more closely 
two principles that have a common basis. 
First, we must understand that reason trees have an internal structure, that 
theoretical disagreement concerning proper legal output can occur at different 
levels of secondary rules, and that all reason trees ultimately rely on a primitive 
assumption or assumptions (while also silently omitting an unimaginable num-
ber of other assumptions implicit in the semi-logical glue between assertions). 
Second, we need to appreciate that legal practice consists not in executing a 
particular model of law but the cooperation of individuals under individualized 
models of law, where an empirically sufficient subset of participants accepts a 
common model, despite disagreeing on elaborations of that model. Law is, 
thus, something that can both be perceived externally, by observing that others 
are cooperating, and accepted internally, by accepting locally identified models. 
And so now I turn to a consideration of the internal perspective, a model of 
rules as institutional actors construct them. 
 
 100.  The modeling framework introduced here implies a broader categorization of legal scholarship that I 
leave for future work. One can identify a missing institution. See Nestor M. Davidson & Ethan J. Leib, 
Regleprudence—at OIRA and Beyond, 103 GEO. L.J. 259, 274–94 (2015) (pointing out the importance of in-
cluding the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in any model of administrative action). One can cri-
tique the informational connections between them. See, e.g., Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchy and Hetero-
geneity: How to Read a Statute in a Lower Court, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 433, 440 (2012) (suggesting that the 
reason structure of statutory interpretation should be different between lower courts and the Supreme Court, 
and thus, that different courts should examine different sorts of information when answering ostensibly the 
same question). One can argue for alternative intra-institutional reason trees (the most common form of schol-
arship) and examine legal output to reconstruct reason trees (to argue, for example, they differ from their char-
acterization in opinions or that they fail to yield to the reasons of other institutions). See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, 
Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 22 (1910). One can also illuminate disputes among legal 
actors by showing the differences between their implicit models. 
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C. A Model of Rules in an Institutional Setting 
The secondary rules that govern institutional action come in qualitatively 
different categories and can be ordered in ascending levels of generality. A 
newly minted first-year law student often feels as though he or she has em-
barked on a colossal endeavor to build the right model of “the law” that con-
tains all of the rules in their proper place. But a critical leap is made when the 
student begins to perceive both the absence of the list and still some order in 
the sea of possible justifications for decisions—(a) that some sorts of reasons 
go together and (b) that some reasons lead the decision-maker to invoke, take 
account of, or ignore the reasons of other institutions. They then begin to per-
ceive the cooperative web of law in its truer complexity and that disagreement 
can arise without wrongness. 
I will discuss these levels in order, but, to summarize, there are four: 
(1) dispute resolution, (2) reason choice, (3) institution choice, and (4) institu-
tional theory.101 For each level, there is possible disagreement over the choice 
of resolving reasons and over the application of the chosen reasons.102 Viewed 
within a single level, such disagreement can therefore appear either theoretical, 
being a dispute over grounds, or practical, concerning a potentially falsifiable 
application of agreed-upon reasons. 
What is more, categorizing the reasoning structure this way exposes the 
senses in which an institution’s decision-making can be viewed as primitive or 
systematized. Hart’s distinction between sophisticated legal systems and what 
he called primitive legal systems (those lacking secondary rules of recognition, 
change, and adjudication) is both too broad and not broad enough.103 All legal 
systems are ultimately primitive, but they can be so at different levels and on 
different questions. To see the sense in which that is so, let us first examine the 
sorts of decisions and disagreements reached at each level of institutional rea-
soning. I imagine in what follows an institution that believes it is tasked with 
reaching a decision. Its participants, each possessing a model of the institution 
and accepting some identified models of other participants, now work together 
to do so. Our analysis will build the following chart, identifying different levels 
at which they might disagree and, at each level, whether their disagreement is 
theoretical (concerning reasons for a conclusion) or empirical (concerning how 
the reason applies to the question at hand). 
TABLE 1 
 
 101.  In an earlier version of this schema, I described these levels somewhat differently and was focused a 
bit more on pedagogy than on theory. See Christian Turner, Leveling Up, HYDRATEXT: LAW, THEORY, 
COMPUTING, AND RELATED GEEKERY (July 25, 2014), http://www.hydratext.com/blog/2014/7/25/leveling-up. 
The simplified version is a useful framework around which I organized a course in Legislation and Regulation 
for first-year students. 
 102.  There is a similarity between the levels of institutional reasoning I map here and the levels of gener-
ality of ideas in discourse identified by political scientists. “The first level encompasses the specific policies or 
‘policy solutions’ proposed by policy makers. The second level encompasses the more general programs that 
underpin the policy ideas. . . . At an even more basic level are the ‘public philosophies,’ ‘public sentiments,’ or 
‘deep core’ . . . .” Schmidt, supra note 8, at 306 (citations omitted). 
 103.  HART, supra note 10, at 91–94. 
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Level Reason (Theoretical) Application (Empirical) 
1: Dispute  
resolution 
Justification (theoretical at the 
level of fact) 
Decision 
2: Reason choice Reason for choice of justification 
(theoretical at the level of policy) 
Justification identification 
3: Institution 
choice 
Reason for institutional assign-
ment (theoretical at the level of 
organization) 
Institutional assignment 
4: Institutional the-
ory 
Theory of institutional assignment 
(theoretical at the level of cooper-
ation) 
Reason for assignment 
 
1. Level One: Deploying Reasons 
At level one, the legal analyst examines the informational inputs concern-
ing the decision to be made and makes a decision applying some reason. Put 
slightly differently, the level-one practitioner can seize upon reasons to resolve 
a case. 
For example, suppose a person demands payment from a business owner 
after being struck by a barrel that somehow fell out of the business’s second-
story window.104 The level-one practitioner, hearing these facts and various, but 
contradictory, sets of reasons for resolution urged by the two sides, concludes 
the plaintiff should win. Perhaps he or she decides (1) that negligent conduct 
that somehow directly (meaning, as far as the practitioner can tell, not too indi-
rectly) injures someone creates a duty of compensation and (2) that negligence 
should be found even when there is no direct information concerning the negli-
gent actions themselves if the consequence of the unobserved actions can hard-
ly be imagined to occur without negligence. 
Armed with these reasons, the practitioner then decides that barrels do not 
fall out of second-story windows without someone’s gross inattention and that 
there was no explanation from the business owner that would suggest other-
wise. This being so, the injury directly resulted from the negligence of the 
business owner. The level-one practitioner then concludes that the legal system 
should order the business owner to compensate the victim. 
Note that there is an argument here concerning how the reason chosen 
processes input data into output data. Without that, our practitioner would be an 
actor, not a decision-maker. Our goal in understanding legal systems is to un-
derstand decision-making pursuant to cooperation, not unreflective action that 
cannot be modeled. There is no argument, however, supporting the practition-
er’s particular choice of reason. Much lay argument concerning law operates at 
level one. A proponent of a result will cite a reason but not reasons for choos-
ing that reason. 
 
 104.  The example I use here, obviously, is a familiar torts case. Byrne v. Boadle (1863) 159 Eng. Rep. 
299, 299. Its decision more or less mirrors the level-one analysis given here and is thus primitive when viewed 
from level two. 
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Another level-one practitioner might disagree with the result in the barrel 
case, not with the reasons given but with how the reasons apply to the input da-
ta. Maybe she believes that barrels often fall out of windows for reasons be-
yond the practical control of any human. Agreeing on criteria of liability and on 
their manner of proof, our lawyers disagree concerning how they apply to the 
input facts here. This is level-one application disagreement, applying the same 
software to the same input data and yet arriving at different outputs. 
Suppose, however, that another level-one practitioner responds that negli-
gence must always be proved and never only inferred and that the plaintiff 
should lose for that reason, whatever the empirical reality of barrels and win-
dows. This level-one disagreement is theoretical, as it involves disagreement 
concerning the grounds for the level-one decision. Our dispute now concerns 
the theory of the decision.105 If the argument does not somehow rise above the 
conclusory citation of disparate reasons and reasoned application to the facts, 
then here at level one we will remain. 
2. Level Two 
If practitioners’ arguments for their preferred reasons for an outcome are 
only conclusory—A argues for outcome X because R; B argues for outcome Y 
because S—then we do not have an argument at the level of reasons, a level-
two argument. We have only a disagreement that appears primitive to those 
seeking to understand the dispute better. A legal system that settles on A’s side 
has made a choice concerning the reason for decision, but its choice is primitive 
from the vantage point of level two, there being no reason supporting its choice 
among competing reasons that could be used to resolve the case.106 
Case after case may be considered in more or less this level-one way, 
though. The rule here is “this.” A finder of apparently lost property should be 
declared its owner as against all the world except the true owner who lost it.107 
What about this other situation? Well there it ought to be “that.” A finder of 
mislaid property does not prevail against the owner of the premises on which 
the property was found.108 
At some point, practitioners are bound to ask themselves what sorts of 
reasons should be used to resolve cases. What reason, for example, do we have 
to arrive at a different rule for cases of lost property than we do for those of 
mislaid property. Strong-willed jurists may demand of each other more than 
 
 105.  This distinction between disagreement at the level of theory and at the level of application, which we 
shall see replicated at each level of analysis, is similar to, and indeed inspired by, Dworkin’s distinction be-
tween propositions of law and grounds of law. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 9, at 4–6; see also Shapiro, su-
pra note 19. 
 106.  A system that is primitive at level one is one that acts without reason and is therefore not a decision-
making entity at all. It acts but does not decide. 
 107.  See, e.g., Armory v. Delamirie (1721) 93 Eng. Rep. 664, 664 (deciding just such a case by stating but 
not justifying this level-one reason). 
 108.  See, e.g., McAvoy v. Medina, 93 Mass. (11 Allen) 548, 549 (Mass. 1866) (deciding that mislaid 
property should be treated differently than lost property in this respect but also moving into level two by citing 
precedent as a reason to choose that rule). 
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ephemeral attachments to reasons to resolve particular cases. They will seek to 
understand better the set of reasons to be deployed. And perhaps they will ar-
gue among themselves about what constitutes a good reason and what sort of 
reason is not so good. They will then develop commitments to reasons for 
choosing among level-one reasons. 
Having reasons for selecting the reason to apply to reach a decision is the 
domain of level two. Our argument at this level can be, as with the first level, 
theoretical or only about application. Here, though, our theoretical argument 
concerns what theory we should use to evaluate possible level-one reasons, and 
our applicative argument concerns the application of a given theory to select a 
level-one reason. 
At this level, instead of seemingly plucking reasons from the ether and 
forming opinions about case outcomes, we are interested in the more general 
calculus of reasons that we will use to resolve cases. Is a concern with econom-
ic efficiency compatible with a belief that law should advance a particular con-
ception of virtue ethics? Are there domains in which the two are compatible but 
other domains in which we must choose, somehow, which theory to bring to 
bear, and with it a concomitant cascade of reasons we will use at level one to 
decide cases? When we argue among ourselves about such things, we are en-
gaged in theoretical, level-two argument. 
In the barrel case, should it matter what the social utility of the business’s 
product is and how liability might interfere with its mission? What if the busi-
ness’s products are extremely useful to some portion of the population but oth-
ers think the business is evil? (Maybe it is building weapons that some believe 
critical for national defense and not immoral for that reason but that others be-
lieve is inherently immoral because of the particular way it maims.) Should the 
degree of societal support for the business matter? Is there too steep a price in 
departing from the uniform view of the cases in situations that can be abstractly 
framed as “injuries proximately caused by negligence,” or would it be sound to 
carve out a social necessity defense? 
Here, at level two, we study the law not by cataloging its “rules” in situa-
tion after situation, mastering some list of reasons bound to specific factual pat-
terns, but by more directly studying the reasons that seem to count and under-
standing why those that do not, do not. Our investigation will cover different 
approaches that contain within them sets of reasons: economic efficiency, dis-
tributive justice, the problems of natural monopoly and collective action, and 
the problem of informational asymmetries and more general imbalances in 
market power. At level two, our sophistication is such that we can even bring 
understanding to areas of the law we have not yet formally studied, because our 
theoretical commitments can generate level-one rules on demand. We can 
begin to predict the kinds of arguments that will be made on each side without 
having to read them first. This, obviously, is a critical skill for an advocate. 
If the institution argues at level two, it maintains a mechanism for legal 
change that is within the law of the institution, rather than an avulsion by fiat. It 
provides a means, in fact the only means, to predict what the law will be in new 
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cases. The level-one reason, or rule, that will resolve a new type of case will be 
derived from level-two theoretical commitments. This is indeed how our courts 
work and why knowledge solely of the so-called “black letter law,” the list of 
level-one reasons, is so infirm. 
Theory is the most important part of the dogma of the law, as the architect 
is the most important man who takes part in the building of a house. The 
most important improvements of the last twenty-five years are improve-
ments in theory. It is not to be feared as unpractical, for, to the competent, 
it simply means going to the bottom of the subject.109 
At level two, our theoretical arguments concern how we should decide 
what reason to use to resolve cases. If we agree on that, then we might still dis-
agree what that agreed-upon commitment implies. For example, we might all 
be thoroughgoing normative law and economists, committed to designing law 
to satisfy exogenous preferences and to the general validity of the rational actor 
model. Yet, we might still disagree on how to apply that level-two reason to ar-
rive at a level-one reason (or rule) that can resolve a case challenging, say, a 
rent control ordinance on due process grounds. Our level-two disagreement, 
just like that at level one, can be at the level of theory or application. 
3. Level Three 
Despite our new-found confidence in understanding the different levels at 
which we can argue, we occasionally run into cases where the theory for resort-
ing to the particular reasons to decide cases are of a type unlike the others. The-
se are cases in which, whatever the rationales could be for reaching any given 
level-two conclusion, there is a reason not to do so—that this decision-maker, 
or this institution, is somehow the wrong one for the task of reason-choosing in 
this case. Like a child first realizing that other people also have thoughts and 
feelings and exist within a larger community of thinking and feeling beings, at 
level three, the institution recognizes its place within a system and asks which 
institution’s level-two reasoning should be consulted to arrive at a rule for deci-
sion. 
And so, perhaps, in our barrel case, our tribunal has never before found 
negligence and ordered compensation when the specific actions constituting 
negligence have not been described. We might believe that whether to recog-
nize and rely on reasons that would accomplish that task should be left not to 
the tribunal itself but to another institution, perhaps the legislature. That is our 
level-three conclusion, which will lead us to channel the level-two reasoning of 
the legislature, not our own. 
Why? What is our level-three reason for reaching that level-three conclu-
sion? Maybe we believe that allowing courts to find negligence without form-
ing judgments about exactly what happened will lead to decisions to create cat-
egories of industrial output that are always subject to compensation obligations 
when they cause injury, without regard to the internal considerations of cost 
 
 109.  Holmes, supra note 15, at 477. 
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and benefit that a plaintiff would otherwise have some responsibility to ferret 
out. Judges, acting case by case, might not appreciate the effects of those cate-
gorizations, making it too easy to bring lawsuits that have a chance of winning, 
and creating far too much social cost. Maybe broad-based hearings, across mul-
tiple industrial sectors, would be wise, and maybe the information thus adduced 
would counsel a more targeted solution to the problem of accidents that happen 
as a result of complex industrial processes. 
This is a level-three argument for our conclusion that the legislature’s 
theory of presumed negligence should control, and, by making it, we engage a 
more expansive model of the legal landscape that includes other institutions 
and their reason trees. The simple model that has information concerning a dis-
pute flowing into the legal system and back out again after decision (Dispute → 
Legal System → Resolution) is too simple to describe the sorts of considera-
tions we think appropriate in cases like this one. A legal system is not just one 
decision-maker but many, with information flowing among them. And level-
three legal reasoning concerns not just sifting through the reasons that will lead 
ultimately to case outcomes but to giving a reason to assign that level-two task 
to a particular institution within the legal system. This is a question for the leg-
islature. This one is for the courts. This is for an administrative agency. Those 
are conclusions about institutional assignment, and once we begin to speak in 
terms of why we might wish to make such assignments, we command a much 
more sophisticated understanding of legal systems. Now the decision-maker 
considers whether it must apply its own reasons (in which case level two would 
suffice) or whether it must defer or completely yield to the reasons chosen by 
others. The decision-makers must now identify, judge, and accept or reject 
models of the legal system that include institutions beyond their own, together 
with the informational content and models of reasons flowing within and from 
those other institutions. It is a level-three theory that gives literal shape to the 
institutions-and-information models of legal systems we have identified. 
If we each agree on the reason that should govern an institutional choice, 
competency or precedent on decisional hierarchy, say, but disagree on the out-
put of that reason, then, as at lower levels, we have applicative disagreement. 
What if we disagree about the reasons that should govern the choice of institu-
tion whose level-two reasoning should apply? Here, we arrive again at a theo-
retical dispute. 
We have arrived also at a new ground from which lower level disputes 
appear primitive. From here, level-two theoretical disputes are primitive, pos-
sessing no ground of correctness. The level-three theorist sees that ultimately 
“ungroundable” level-two argument is inevitable. The choice of what to do and 
why is, ultimately, political in this sense. It is a matter of choice. But this level-
three theorist approves or disapproves the legal decision based on the identity 
of the institution assigned the ultimately political task of level-two argumenta-
tion. 
Debates over the proper interpretive theory for statutes, constitutions, con-
tracts, and other documents can be understood, and I believe are best under-
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stood, as disagreements about the proper level-three theory. They concern dis-
tinctive models of the relevant portion of the legal system and of institutional 
reason trees. A theory deriving meaning from original intent, for example, is a 
model that recovers reasons for decisions from the reasons of the promulgating 
institution at the time of promulgation. A more general deference model might 
yield to the reasons of that promulgating institution but as it is now constituted. 
An original public meaning originalist finds authority in the reasons that the 
document’s original audience, a new box in our legal model, would identify in 
that document. Textualism is a method that might be intended to approximate, 
in a “least error” or second-best sense, those likely reasons.110 All of these in-
volve some channeling, some effort at the adoption of the level-two reasoning 
of another institution, whether past or present. Obviously, the institution could 
also use documents or other output from within its own system of level-two 
reasons, generating rules of a decision from that combination, yielding a form, 
but not the only form, of living constitutionalism, for example. Indeed, the 
choice even whether to be bound by the U.S. Constitution is a level-three 
choice. 
In all this, as with the other levels, the legality of a participant’s resort to a 
particular theory is identical with, and nothing more than, the group’s ac-
ceptance or not of the model she has chosen. Whether the system tolerates dis-
parate interpretive theories is a matter of the acceptance of those theories, de-
spite disagreement. It is possible to imagine a supreme group of judges, some 
of whom make arguments that cite reasons arising from a constitution and some 
of whom cite only “common sense,” publishing opinions and otherwise getting 
on with their business despite their disagreements. They have mutually accept-
ed identified models with which they disagree. But among a different group, 
one that minimally accepts level-three reasons that do identify a particular con-
stitutional source, one can easily imagine an end to such cooperation—and the 
beginning of civil conflict—when a participant rejects that source and refuses 
to go along. The others would decry the participant’s actions as illegitimate and 
illegal. Perhaps he or she is then removed by the legal decision of this or anoth-
er institution. The point is that cooperation-disrupting disagreement can occur 
 
 110.  I leave for future work more precise and comprehensive translation of the various modes of original-
ism and of other interpretive theories into the models of legal systems as I set them out here. The most careful 
mapping and argument concerning originalism is probably Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism (Ill. Pub. 
Law and Legal Theory Research Series, No. 07–24, 2008), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1120244. In short, Solum lays out various claims concern-
ing the possibility and desirability of channeling original meanings to decide contemporary questions. His Fixa-
tion and Clause Meaning Theses are arguments at level three. They are intended to identify the reasons one can 
recover from a communication and thus speak to the possibility of a legal system model through which a court 
can recover the reason trees of historical institutions. Id. at 2–5. The arguments for Fidelity Thesis, that we 
should in fact choose historical institutions (promulgators, audience, or combination) at level three, is a level-
four argument, the sort described next. Id. at 151–57 (in which Solum “survey[s] the reasons that judges, offi-
cials, and citizens might have for adopting the attitudes and duties implied by fidelity”). Solum details overlap-
ping theories for preferring originalist reasons for using the originalist model. An understanding of interpretive 
theories as equivalent to institutional models, again, has much in common with Corey Yung’s intriguing work. 
Yung, supra note 89, at 331–39. 
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at this level or any other. Cooperation implies mutual acceptance of identified 
models. An interpretative commitment is just a model containing level-three 
reasons. And so, the permissible bounds of interpretation are no more and no 
less than the set of tolerable models. 
4. Level Four 
Once we have come this far, it is obvious there is yet at least one more 
level to attain. After all, once we say that we should ask what reason we have to 
assign a decision to a particular institution, it is plain that we could have rea-
sons for choosing among competing such reasons. And so, level four is attained 
upon recognizing that much of the work in law, and much dispute that seems 
bound up with substance, arises from disputes concerning the proper reasons to 
use when deciding on institutional assignment. Why should this institution, ra-
ther than that, make the irreducibly political choice our cooperation requires? 
Should we channel the institution most competent in this field, most representa-
tive, best resourced, most accountable in the short term, most accountable in 
the long term, or most likely to account fully for costs and benefits? Or should 
we defer entirely to the institutional author of information we otherwise deem 
relevant? Each is a possible level-three reason. We have come to level four, 
where we argue over and decide among such reasons. 
For example, people disagree how courts should treat statutes, constitu-
tions, contracts, and other putatively authoritative documents (whether to con-
fine their attention to portions of the text, whether to look at any number of dic-
tionaries, whether to consult legislative metadata concerning the document, 
whether to infer purposes and to aid those purposes, etc.). These disputes are, at 
bottom, disputes about what courts are and what legislatures and other law-
makers are within the legal system. Those constitutive questions can be identi-
fied with the reasons an advocate has for believing particular sets of reasons 
should govern decision of the “who” question. 
Justice Scalia believed that conservation of systemic, democratic legiti-
macy is an overriding desideratum in developing theories of assignment and 
that unelected judges achieve legitimacy only by channeling the policies (the 
level-two decisions) of representative bodies and not by choosing their own.111 
This is because legitimacy arises primarily from more or less direct and imme-
diate accountability to the people. Those who disagree with him have different 
level-four theories of assignment. They may believe, for example, that legiti-
macy is important, but it is (a) achieved in part by pragmatic decision-making 
and not only by deferring to popularly elected institutions, or perhaps (b) actu-
ally diminished by clothing decisions in illusory certainty and, instead, ad-
 
 111.  While his jurisprudence is replete with level-three conclusions and level-two arguments derived from 
textualist interpretations, Justice Scalia’s fullest level-four argument for public-meaning originalism and, by 
extension, textualism can probably be found in his academic work. See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in 
a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A 
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 9–25 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (arguing for 
textualism from a principle of democratic accountability). 
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vanced by candor concerning the uncertainty of, say, constitutional or statutory 
meaning.112 
If there is no mutually agreed-upon model of level-four reasoning within 
the institution, then the theoretical disagreement at level four is primitive. The 
cooperation continued between Justices Scalia and Breyer on account of ac-
ceptance of one another’s models, not agreement. 
If one member cites reason R for choosing institution X’s level-two work 
and another cites reason S for choosing institution Y’s, we again have a primi-
tive argument, viewed from level four, as we did with unresolved theoretical 
arguments at lower levels. Our own constitutional law is primitive in the sense 
that judges have discretion over theory choice at level four that is canalized on-
ly to the extent their stated theories are accepted by others and that their down-
level conclusions fall within acceptable boundaries. Because the Constitution 
does not include provisions dictating how it should be interpreted, it is plainly 
open to theoretical argument concerning the right informational model to use to 
decide questions arising under it.113 Judges will find no further uncontroversial 
“secondary rules of recognition, change, and adjudication” that will identify the 
correctness of their level-four theories or indicate the legitimacy of a change to 
them or application of them. 
 
 112.  Both of these critiques appear in Richard Posner’s review of a later textualist manifesto. Richard A. 
Posner, The Incoherence of Antonin Scalia, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 23, 2012), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/106441/scalia-garner-reading-the-law-textual-originalism (reviewing Antonin 
Scalia & Bryan Garner, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012)). 
 113.  See William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349, 2351–53, 2403–07 (2015) 
(arguing that originalism, and thus, the model of the legal system to which it corresponds, is correct using a 
level-four theoretical argument concerning conventional interpretive practice but acknowledging other argu-
ments that would support other models); Philip C. Bobbitt, The Age of Consent, 123 YALE L.J. 2334, 2372–73 
(2014) (“[T]here is no hierarchy of modal forms but rather than this being a cause for despair, it opens up a 
space in constitutional decisionmaking for the role of the individual conscience.”); Cass R. Sunstein, There Is 
Nothing That Interpretation Just Is, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 193, 211–12 (2015). 
If the founding document set out the rules for its own interpretation, judges would be bound by those rules 
(though any such rules would themselves need to be construed). But the Constitution sets out no such 
rules. For this reason, any approach to the document must be defended by reference to some account that 
is supplied by the interpreter. 
Sunstein, supra.  Consider an example Baude cites as a hard level-four case. Suppose we know that an original-
ist approach, on account of the low-quality, level-two reasoning of the institution that would be channeled as 
originally authoritative, will lead to decision-making as irrational as if “all judges [were] openly decid[ing] 
cases on the basis of astrology.” Baude, supra, at 2396. Would the conventional, positivistic duty Baude identi-
fies to be originalist yield to broader commitments to minimal rationality in that extreme case? The realistic 
theory of modeling advanced here helps us to see how that might be so. Originalism implies a model that can 
be accepted and argued for at various levels, where acceptance almost certainly arises from a constant simula-
tion of potential cases and subsequent affective and logical reaction by those considering such acceptance. Irra-
tionalism as deep as astrology would certainly cause a mostly rational participant to decide that his or her level-
four theory must be more complicated than “originalism” and must include limits—that originalism was a 
means to a broader end and that those means only go as far as the ends are advanced. This only shows the dif-
ference in aim that Baude and I have. I seek an explanation of the phenomenon of legal systems and as system-
atic a way to understand them as reality allows. Baude makes a normative, level-four argument for a particular 
model, but he acknowledges that other models are possible. Sunstein and Bobbitt address themselves to the fact 
that our constitutional law is primitive at level four, meaning that a model of the legal system that animates an 
interpretive approach may be adopted and accepted but will never be provably correct. 
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There are obviously many potential elements of a level-four theory. The 
point is that once we begin to discuss at this level, we can sometimes become 
clearer about what our actual disagreement concerns, where the irreducible and 
ultimately political judgment about control must lie. 
D. The Monopoly Example 
Returning to our Monopoly players,114 we can now see their dispute as an 
evolving state of the players’ modeling their cooperation and judging those 
models. They may begin by mutually accepting a locally identified model of 
nothing more than themselves, as a group, maintaining a level-two rule that 
disputes will be resolved by the reasons contained in the rulebook that defines 
their game. Immediately upon encountering an unfamiliar rule, the auction rule 
in our example, our gamers diverge. Their disagreement concerns whether to 
hold an auction. But, in fact, it goes to how that question should be answered. 
One player revises his model, because he does not accept the reason prescribed 
in the rulebook. They have a very practical disagreement at level one, because 
they favor different decisional outcomes. But there is theoretical disagreement 
at level one: they do not agree whether the auction rule should determine the 
result. One says an auction should be held because the auction rule is part of the 
game. Another says no auction should be held because the auction rule is not a 
part of the game. 
Moving to level two, knowing that our players have selected different rea-
sons at level one, we might wonder whether they have done so based on differ-
ing theories or on differing applications of the same theory. Here, their differ-
ence is theoretical: One cites the instruction book as authoritative, and another 
cites the customary manner in which “people” play the game. Those theories 
might be further justified by appeals to cheap coordination, to continuity of a 
local gaming social practice, or any other such grounds. Whatever the bottom 
of the position of each gamer, there is theoretical disagreement among them at 
level two. They do not agree on the grounds for determining whether the auc-
tion rule is a part of the game. 
If one player believes that the group should yield to the host’s choice of 
rule and another believes that they should yield to the inferred intentions of the 
game’s creators, then there is disagreement at level three. At this level, they 
have in mind not just different rules but different cooperative structures. For 
one, there is just the group of friends with an authoritative host. For another, 
there is another box containing the game’s creators, and reasons exist to defer 
to their rules. If all the friends ultimately believe that “group fun” should drive 
their choices concerning how to interpret the rules of their game, then perhaps 
they agree theoretically at level four but have an applicative disagreement lead-
ing them to different reasons to use in choosing a decision-maker. That is be-
cause they do not agree what a commitment to fun implies and what their 
choice of authoritative institution should be. 
 
 114.  See supra Section I.B. 
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However deeply we reach into their modeling minds, we recognize, intui-
tively, that their cooperation will be, at some point, primitive. It will be a matter 
of will, rather than logic. The normativity of the conditions of their game quite 
clearly does not arise somehow from the rules themselves. Nor does it spring 
from the concept of a “game.” Their obligations to following the rules are no 
more and no less than their obligations to continue their cooperation. And that 
is, more or less, derivative of their felt obligations to one another, modified by 
the acceptability of defecting or the importance of collaborating in this instance 
of cooperation within their broader set of social projects together. 
V. ANSWERING THE BIG QUESTIONS 
A. A Summary Overview 
A model of a legal system is a set of information-exchanging institutions, 
each with one or more sets of reason trees. A reason tree, again, is a tree of sec-
ondary rules for the production of informational output given informational in-
put.115 Participant A believes participant B has acted legitimately when A per-
ceives B’s actions to be consistent with a locally accepted model of the 
institution corresponding to their cooperative enterprise. That is, A accepts B’s 
judgment if it accords with a model of the institution that A accepts, even if A 
prefers another model of the institution that would reject B’s particular judg-
ment. 
Importantly, A’s judgment concerning the legitimacy of B’s model de-
pends on its fit with a model that A accepts under the set of actual and imag-
ined resolutions. A may later find reason to reject the model he or she had ac-
cepted in cooperation with B if facts arise, or are imagined as a realistic 
possibility, that call for an unacceptable judgment under that model. In such a 
case, the set of models acceptable to A changes, and, in order to cooperate, A 
and B must identify another model of institutional behavior that they both ac-
cept. 
For example, A and B, Supreme Court Justices, may each accept the mod-
el of their institution that identifies the controlling role of the Constitution, a set 
of acceptable (even if not preferred) interpretive methods to extract meaning 
from the Constitution, and, most basically, the principle of majoritarianism to 
identify the Court’s institutional output, i.e., the majority opinion. Because they 
each accept this model, A and B cooperate despite theoretical disagreement at 
various levels arising from interpretive differences in any number of cases. 
The fact of model acceptance is just that, a fact. It could be otherwise, and 
it does not follow from any other rule. But it is a social fact that does not pre-
clude radical and theoretical disagreement about what the institution’s output 
ought to be or even what more specific models ought to be used. Our discus-
sion of reason trees illustrated the tiered complexity of models and the qualita-
tively different ways in which agreement can be reached and disagreement had. 
 
 115.  See supra Section IV.B. 
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The acceptance of a basic model, the mental act equivalent to cooperation it-
self, represents agreement only about the validity of the output, not its correct-
ness. 
Such a basic model, if it is shared, is equivalent to Hart’s rule of recogni-
tion—but at a local level, the level of the institution itself. A legal system, as a 
union of institutions, is a product of local existence criteria. An individual ac-
cepts a legal system if he or she observes its functioning as consistent with a 
model of institutions and information that he or she accepts (for reasons rang-
ing from enthusiastic agreement to fear-drenched coercion). A legal system ex-
ists if sufficient people accept models they believe describe the operation of in-
stitutions that cooperation continues. 
B. The Traditional Questions of Jurisprudence 
How does the theory of law as mental modeling comprehend the tradi-
tional, big questions of jurisprudence? While analysis of the theory’s place 
within the field as to each of these questions would constitute a full work on its 
own, it may help to highlight the theory’s more obvious answers.116 
Identity: According to what reasons is something called a law while anoth-
er thing is not? What identifies something as law? 
Possibility: How is it possible to recognize something as a law without ac-
knowledging something else as law that sanctions that recognition? If 
law is necessary to identify something as a law, we would seem to be 
either in an infinite regression of identity questions or unable to identi-
fy anything at all as law. 
Normativity: What are the criteria (a) for declaring a law good or bad and 
(b) for concluding that it ought to be obeyed? 
Morality: Is there an irreducibly moral component in the task of identifying 
something as law? 
We might add one more to this list: 
Interpretation: If a datum is identified as “law,” how should it be used by 
an institution that concludes the datum is relevant to a decision it un-
dertakes? 
The traditional approaches to jurisprudence have amounted to statements 
about what the essence of law is and arguments applying that essence to answer 
these basic questions.117 To speak very generally, these descriptions have 
amounted to pictures of law as: 
 
 116.  The outline here has been heavily influenced, as has been much of my thought concerning positivism 
and its challengers, by Scott Shapiro. The nature of these basic questions about legal systems is well-covered in 
the opening chapters of his book. SHAPIRO, supra note 17, at 1–50. 
 117.  See Brian Tamanaha, Necessary and Universal Truths About Law?, 30 RATIO JURIS 3, 3 (2017) (col-
lecting essentialist statements of the jurisprudential aim, including, for example: Julie Dickson, EVALUATION 
AND LEGAL THEORY 18 (John Gardner ed., 2001); Joseph Raz, BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND INTERPRETATION 
  
1348 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2018 
1.  the commands, backed by threats, of a sovereign that is habitually 
obeyed,118 
2.  the predictions concerning how courts will resolve disputes in future, 
hypothetical cases,119 
3.  a cascade of rules proceeding ultimately from a rule of recognition that 
is obeyed and faithfully applied by an influential subgroup as a matter 
of social practice,120 
4.  rules that all comply with some basic norm,121 
5.  those rules that are part of a system that meets certain moral require-
ments that are authoritative on grounds outside the control of any hu-
mans,122 
6.  those rules that are part of a system that meets certain moral require-
ments that themselves can be discovered through a process of reason-
ing from axiomatic but human-derived conceptions of the good,123 
7.  those rules that are recognized by both the legal system and morality, 
8.  the product of enactments by various institutions, which enactments 
meet certain requirements of fit with what has come before within the 
same system and that do so in a way that can be acceptably judged as 
consistent with the system’s political morality,124 
9.  the elaborations by various officers that are consistent with a pre-
existing social plan intended to resolve future problems and also con-
sistent with the idea of social planning,125 and 
10.  the commands of those with sufficient power to compel the actions of 
others, where those commands might appear to be justified by princi-
ple but ultimately reflect the personal interests of the powerful (so that 
all law is no more than the technique by which the powerful hold on to 
power).126 
 
24–25 (2009); Jules Coleman, Incorporationism, Conventionality, and the Practical Difference Thesis, 4 
LEGAL THEORY 381, 393 n.24 (2009)). 
 118.  AUSTIN, supra note 33. 
 119.  Holmes, supra note 15, at 457–60. 
 120.  HART, supra note 10, at 100–17. 
 121.  HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 115 (1945). 
 122.  THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, I-II, Q.95, A.II (Thomas Gilby ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 
2006) (“[E]very human law has just so much of the nature of law as is derived from the law of nature. But if in 
any point it deflects from the law of nature, it is no longer a law but a perversion of law.”). 
 123.  While I have disaggregated three sorts of natural law claims, many natural law theorists embrace 
elements of each. See, e.g., Finnis, supra note 18, at 112–13; Lon. L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A 
Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 644–46 (1958). 
 124.  DWORKIN, supra note 9, at 254–58. 
 125.  SHAPIRO, supra note 17, at 195–232. 
 126.  See Robert W. Gordon, Unfreezing Legal Reality: Critical Approaches to Law, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 195, 196–201 (1987); see also Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical 
Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462, 467–70 (1987) (describing, for the purpose of analysis, the “mystification the-
sis,” “the view that legal rules mystify structures of domination”). 
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What these understandings have in common is their striving to understand 
our social practice of lawmaking and dispute resolution as an integrated system. 
What are we doing when we do law? According to each of these conceptions, 
we act in systematic ways captured by the descriptions and criteria the model 
asserts. In sorting nonlegal human interactions from legal ones, each of these 
theories has been designed to answer at least some of the basic questions. And 
each has been attacked for failing in ways large and small to do so. 
My approach is different. I deny that there is a single model or concept of 
the law and, instead, assert that to do law is precisely to engage cooperatively 
in acts of modeling. Legal participants invoke models to make sense of and to 
reach judgments concerning their shared social enterprise, just as they do with 
other social and physical phenomena. Because of the complexity of the task, 
there is no single model that all participants in a legal system use in all instanc-
es. And because they have not reached agreement as to all actions that should 
be taken, they even disagree about whether particular models are correct, while 
ultimately accepting decisions at least consistent with acceptable models of 
greater generality. 
“The Law” is, therefore, an illusion. There is only the participation in that 
portion of our perceived reality that we conceive, through mental modeling, as 
the practice of law. There is no Cathedral; there are only views of it. In this 
sense, law arises from the act of perceiving, not from a thing awaiting percep-
tion. 
In this work, I have introduced a particular language, one of institutions 
connected by informational pathways, that describes generically the models 
people maintain about law. With that language, we can describe legal disa-
greements and legal practice in new and more insightful terms. It helps us to 
see how legal practice is the continual fashioning, querying, adopting, rejecting, 
accepting, and refashioning of information-institution models. 
1. Identity: According to What Reasons Is Something Called a Law While 
Another Thing Is Not? What Identifies Something as Law? 
The legal system is perceived by an individual as an identified model of 
institutions and their reason trees. An external identification, or a perception, of 
law is one’s observation of a group that appears to be cooperating and main-
taining mutual acceptance of models of their cooperation. A law within that le-
gal system is shorthand for a particular datum or set of data identified as au-
thoritative by an institution within one’s model of the legal system. 
The modeling understanding looks directly at structured thinking as it ex-
ists in the brain. It does not view law as a concept defined by essential proper-
ties.127 Of course, law as the actual human understanding of the conditions of 
 
 127.  Compare my approach with an essentialist approach, one which seeks to establish necessary attrib-
utes to count as a legal system. Let U be the set of all properties that social institutions might have. Let L be the 
set of all sets of properties corresponding to all instances we would like to call law. Let C be the intersection of 
all sets in L. C is the set of those properties present in every legal system. Let P be the power set, or set of all 
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cooperation, as the mutual efforts to know other minds, might be considered a 
sort of concept. Perhaps it could even be critiqued on the grounds Brian Ta-
manaha criticizes most analytical jurisprudence.128 He points to theorists’ ten-
dency to bootstrap concepts using pre-theoretical assumptions concerning what 
counts as law. As he puts it, “[t]his method is circular: Their assumptions about 
what is the paradigm of law determines the resulting theory of what law is, 
which is then applied to dictate what does and does not qualify as law for all 
places and times.”129 
I do, indeed, rely on a pre-theoretical claim that human beings recognize 
cooperation and decide whether to cooperate. Importantly, though, everything I 
argue is potentially as falsifiable as any other claim about human behavior. It is 
falsifiable not in the weak and circular sense that we can check whether the de-
scription captures historical systems we otherwise believe should be captured, 
but in the much stronger sense that investigations of cognition can support, al-
ter, or disprove the manner in which I argue law is perceived and judged. 
Whether one agrees that the cooperative systems described as they are by this 
theory should define law as a concept is a far less interesting question to me. I 
turn below to the related concern that law and other cooperative systems may 
be distinguished by their normativity. 
Another sense of the identity question, though, is how we can predict the 
contents of what a cooperative group will call its “law.” Our Monopoly players 
and the residents of a town within the jurisdiction of the town council are simi-
larly situated from the point of view of the modeling theory. We have two co-
operative groups, the laws of which are identified by the models its participants 
maintain. But, one might argue, there is something that causes ordinary people 
to call the latter system a system of laws and the former system a cooperative 
game with rules. 
This criticism does not express skepticism of the underlying modeling 
mechanism. Rather, it urges better appreciation of the heterogeneity of attitudes 
a participant may have toward the variety of cooperative forms with which she 
has experience. Compared to a game among friends, a town’s legal system may 
be more formal, more remote from the individual, less susceptible to change, or 
any number of other differences concerning content. But Brian Tamanaha has it 
exactly right: The only way to know whether a group of people considers a le-
 
possible subsets, of C. Any member of P is a subset of properties present in all legal systems. Let Q be the sub-
set of P so that no member of Q is a subset of any member of the set of all social institutions that is not in L. 
The claim that there is an a posteriori concept of law is the claim that Q is not empty—that there is a set of 
properties common to all legal systems that is possessed by no social institution that is not a legal system. The 
universalist claim, that all legal systems are defined by some essence is that Q has a single member. Note that L 
and U quite obviously depend on our observations and imaginations. There is no evidence that it is possible to 
identify a singleton Q no matter the U. 
In contrast, my theory relies on a single property, called human cooperation, and recognizes a legal system with 
every instance of that property. The content of the legal system depends on the states of mind of the partici-
pants in that cooperation. My only pre-theoretical claim is that human cooperation can be identified by humans. 
Again, I realize this is open to critique as itself essentialist. 
 128.  See Tamanaha, supra note 117, at 1. 
 129.  See id. at 14. 
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gal system in the model-theoretical sense to be a legal system in a cultural-
linguistic sense similar to our own conventional notion is to ask or to study 
them.130 In other words, “law” can be distinguished from other forms of coop-
eration only by convention, only by how groups themselves in fact do distin-
guish such forms. If a particular cooperation is not viewed by its participants as 
“law” in the sense we usually use the term, it has nothing to do with the coop-
eration’s modeled structure and everything to do with attitudes toward the co-
operation itself. And those attitudes need not be homogeneous among partici-
pants. A member of the mafia may prioritize mob rules ahead of, and even 
consider them to be more authoritative and binding than, the law of the state or 
town in which the mobster lives. 
2. Possibility: How Is It Possible to Recognize Something as a Law Without 
Acknowledging Something Else as Law That Sanctions That Recognition? 
The modeling theory, like Hart’s theory, finds in acceptance the ultimate 
criterion of law.131 In particular, an individual accepts as law, from the internal 
point of view, those outputs consistent with a model of the legal system she ac-
cepts. This is a cognitive fact. Externally, we can describe the legal system of a 
cooperating group as its mutually accepted models. In degenerate cases, we can 
observe that there is fundamental disagreement, i.e., that there is no minimal 
mutual acceptance, but that cooperation is proceeding on account of mistakes 
concerning locally identified models. 
3. Normativity: What Are the Criteria (a) for Declaring a Law Good or Bad 
and (b) for Concluding That It Ought to Be Obeyed? 
A law is “bad” but obligatory, from an individual’s point of view, if it is 
consistent with a locally accepted model but inconsistent with a locally pre-
ferred model. A law is not obligatory when it is inconsistent with an individu-
al’s locally accepted models. Law’s normativity arises from the acceptance of 
cooperation and is nothing more than the “should” induced by the cooperating 
group. 
Even if an individual concludes that a law is immoral (which is essentially 
to conclude that it is inconsistent with another model of human cooperation she 
maintains and that two cooperative regimes of which she is a part conflict), she 
might conclude that practical considerations require compliance. The fact that 
compliance is justified by practicality means that the individual accepts a mod-
el of the legal system with which the law complies. She may not prefer it, but 
she accepts it.132 
 
 130.  Id. at 16–19 (noting that understanding a group’s law as whatever the group conventionally identifies 
and treats as “law” is “not itself a concept of law but a conventionalist criterion for the identification of law”); 
see also TAMANAHA, supra note 12. 
 131. See supra Section III.D. 
 132.  Of course, practical considerations may be broader than the mere sanction prediction undertaken by a 
Holmesian bad man. Holmes, supra note 15, at 459. But the idea is close, and knowing a participant’s reason 
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Consider the famous gunman scenario.133 An assailant holds up a victim: 
“Your money or your life.” That action, the gun, and the language bind the two 
participants together in an instance of human cooperation, even though it could 
hardly be further from a voluntary union. Even here, there is law, and the gun-
man is making it. The victim accepts a locally identified model, the one in 
which the gunman may decide to kill him unless he complies with the gun-
man’s orders. The statement, “Your money or your life,” is consistent with the 
locally identified model of the legal system. The victim complies with the re-
quest precisely because it is consistent with the accepted model. And his rea-
sons for accepting this model are the reasons for acting in accordance with the 
law that emerges from it. 
Critically, the victim’s acceptance of the model was, as are all attitudes of 
acceptance toward any legal regime, contingent on anticipated input data and 
based on an understanding of the relations among them. If the gunman orders 
something the victim believes would be worse than death, the victim may not 
cooperate. So too, if the victim discovered the gun was fake or if the victim 
suddenly spied approaching police officers, these would affect the reasons the 
victim had for accepting the identified model of the assailant-victim legal sys-
tem. The victim might now not accept an order of the gunman, because he has 
rejected the model of the system in which the gunman’s orders are authorita-
tive. 
The gunman example illustrates my agreement with Scott Hershovitz that 
there is not a distinct “legal” domain of normativity.134 The victim in the above 
example of course does not have a special “gunman-victim law reason” to 
comply with the gunman’s orders.135 Like Hershovitz, I believe that our reasons 
for following what we identify as law are not distinct from other reasons we 
have to cooperate. As he puts it: “Our social practices don’t give rise to new 
kinds of normativity; rather they warrant new normative judgments of the old 
familiar kind. This is true even when the social practice in question involves 
positing rules.”136 
Under the modeling understanding, our judgments concerning the ought-
inducing effect of rules are completely parasitic on our attitudes toward the co-
operation from which the rule structure is inseparable. Our Monopoly players’ 
obligations not to cheat or disrupt are just those they have decided they owe 
one another in their cooperative enterprise, the ones owed with respect to that 
cooperation situated among other instances of cooperation among them. Their 
attitudes would surely be different had they come together not as friends but as 
competitors in a high-stakes monopoly tournament.137 
 
for acceptance could give us insight into the limits of her acceptance in the future as new and unforeseen inputs 
must be processed. 
 133.  See HART, supra note 10, at 19–24. 
 134.  Hershovitz, supra note 11, at 1164–65. 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  Id. at 1197. 
 137.  Hershovitz makes precisely this point using the example of competitive rather than friendly games of 
chess: 
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Different instances of cooperation and their corresponding legal systems 
give rise to different model domains and yield different rules. One’s reasons for 
following those rules coincide with the felt obligation to the other participants 
in that cooperation. This is why punishing rule violations is, essentially, active 
criticism of defection from the cooperation. It is not surprising that groups of-
ten try to assert that the reason for following their rules is deeply moral,138 ba-
sically to stretch the articulated purpose of the cooperative enterprise. If they 
succeed, they can claim that the reason to cooperate with them is the same as 
the reason to be “good” more generally. With that framing, rule violation can 
be criticized as defection from a more global and entrenched system. 
Similarly, civil disobedience is the intentional and publicized defection 
from a group, intended to highlight the severed connection between the legal 
rules of a system and the rules of some other system (religious or moral), both 
of which make claims on the group’s members. Its purpose is to bring the legal 
rules into alignment with those of the other system.139 
4. Morality: Is There an Irreducibly Moral Component in the Task of 
Identifying Something as Law? 
No, not in the sense that there are criteria that sort nonlaw-cooperation 
and law-cooperation. The deeper question is whether there is something about 
the entities that compose the legal system that inevitably, as an empirical mat-
ter, causes the use of one class of models to succeed and another class to fail.140 
Must any successful legal system be consistent with models that have a com-
mon set of roots we could conventionally identify as “morality”? 
 
I said before that the FIDE rules improve play of the game, but that will only be true when the point of 
playing is to match wits in the fashion that the rules facilitate. If the point is simply to have fun, then ap-
peals to the FIDE rules will almost certainly get in the way. 
Id. at 1183. The FIDE rules are “normative” only to the extent cooperating in the competition is normatively 
desirable, in which case the normative tug of the FIDE rules is of the more usual kind, urging us to cooperate 
when we have agreed to cooperate and wish to continue. 
 138.  See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 US 186, 196–97 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (defending 
Georgia’s sodomy ban by arguing that “[t]o hold that the act of homosexual sodomy is somehow protected as a 
fundamental right would be to cast aside millennia of moral teaching”), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558 (2003). 
 139.  See Letter from Martin Luther King, Jr. to Eight Clergymen from Alabama (Apr. 16, 1963) (“Letter 
from Birmingham Jail”), reprinted in 26 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 835, 841–42 (1993). 
I submit that an individual who breaks a law that conscience tells him is unjust, and who willingly accepts 
the penalty of imprisonment in order to arouse the conscience of the community over its injustice, is in re-
ality expressing the highest respect for law. . . . [W]e who engage in nonviolent direct action are not the 
creators of tension. We merely bring to the surface the hidden tension that is already alive. We bring it out 
in the open, where it can be seen and dealt with. Like a boil that can never be cured so long as it is cov-
ered up but must be opened with all its ugliness to the natural medicines of air and light, injustice must be 
exposed, with all the tension its exposure creates, to the light of human conscience and the air of national 
opinion before it can be cured. 
Id. 
 140.  This rationalized natural law, a minimal set of criteria for law to function, is evident in both the pro-
cedural minima of Fuller and of the norm-inseparability suggested by John Finnis. See Finnis, supra note 18, at 
107–15. 
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Lon Fuller’s story of the chaos of Imperium Rexum should prompt us to 
consider reasons that a fundamentally unfair manner of dealing out coercion 
will not be stable.141 Again, I do not think that instability or a lack of longevity 
negates the fact of the cooperative process while it exists. Unstable cooperation 
is still cooperation while it lasts. It is also obviously possible to accept a model 
of cooperation over which one has no control and into the finer details of which 
one has virtually no insight. The reasons for doing so almost certainly do not 
run deeply, and so such acceptance is likely to be thin. 
It is worth noting, though, that Fuller’s eight routes to the failure of a le-
gal system all describe types of rulemaking that would be nearly impossible for 
a participant in the system to model.142 For Fuller, there is no law without a 
moral obligation of obedience, and that obligation attaches only if the eight 
failures are negated and law attains, thusly, what he calls an “inner morali-
ty.”143 We might understand Fuller’s principles of inner morality not as criteria 
for something ultimate, the view that invites appeal to more traditional under-
standing of natural law, but as the minimal conditions under which modeling in 
rule-understanding detail will become possible. If an individual cannot model 
the legal system at a level of generality that, at least, reaches statements of the 
rules that will apply to adjudicate behaviors within her realms of possibility, 
then she cannot locally accept such a model. And her cooperation, if it exists at 
all, will necessarily be at a level above the level of practical rules. In an act of 
ego death, she will accept a purely authoritarian model: that Rex decides based 
on reasons known only to him. Her acceptance will be only of the fact of Rex’s 
authority. She may “remain[] faithful to him throughout his long and inept 
reign. [But she will not be] faithful to his law, for he never made any.”144 In-
deed, she will not perceive any. 
Again, whether she ought to comply with Rex’s rule, whether we should 
call Rex’s system a “legal system,” these are matters of judgment and conven-
tion. The modeling theory makes it possible to distinguish from the model of an 
ordinary legal system an information-and-institutions model that consists of no 
reason trees that go deeper than authority submission. The mechanisms are the 
same. The labeling need not be. 
What about the constraints of substantive morality? My model presuppos-
es that law can be identified with institutional output and that characteristic of 
accepting that output as law is the acceptance of a model of law that includes 
that institution and a reason tree within it that is consistent with its output. 
Moral principles important to the group may not be announced by any particu-
lar institution. An individual may only observe lots of behavior consistent with 
them (though they may hear people talk about them, perhaps even articulating 
 
 141.  See FULLER, supra note 18, at 33–41. 
 142.  These routes are, roughly: secret or unpublicized rules, obscure and impossible to understand rules, 
retroactive rules, contradictory rules, rules that are physically impossible to comply with, rules that rapidly 
change, and a strong divergence between rules as adopted and as applied. Id. 
 143.  See, e.g., Fuller, supra note 123. 
 144.  See FULLER, supra note 18, at 41. 
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the rules that would form within a reason tree of someone acting consistently 
with them). Observing lots of consistent behavior is to observe convergent hab-
its. This may, externally, allow us to predict what others are likely to do in the 
future and perhaps even modulate our own behavior to match the group’s. But 
further, it may be possible to infer reason trees (to identify models) and, thus, to 
infer part of the group’s code. Not acting consistently with such reasons could 
then create in other participants grounds for criticism, and, further, there may 
be institutions that use that moral principle in their reason trees and thus take 
legal actions (produce outputs) based on the individual’s deviation. Knowing 
this, an individual identifies models of institutions within the group as contain-
ing these moral reasons even if those reasons are nowhere stated. 
The upshot of this complex process is that an outside observer, taking ac-
count of the multiplicity of legal relationships within the group, might have a 
hard time identifying the social facts, which arise from moral rules that have 
not been expressed, behind later treatment of defectors. But these outcomes 
may be an emergent property of a group whose members have internally identi-
fied and accepted models that are consistent with the moral principle they have 
seen followed by others and assume others have adopted. 
5. Interpretation: If a Datum Is Identified as “Law,” How Should It Be Used 
by an Institution That Concludes the Datum Is Relevant? 
An institution interprets law when it identifies the reasoning of another in-
stitution and uses it to connect an input question to institutional output. When 
we say that an institution interprets a particular legal datum, we mean that it 
identifies a model of the legal system and a set of reasons arising from an insti-
tution within that model. The model the interpreting institution chooses and the 
institution or institutions it privileges within the model are justified, ultimately, 
by a level-four theory. Generically, an interpretation has the following form: 
FIGURE 10 
 [source institution] → [output] → [interpreting institution] → [extraction of privi-
leged institution’s reasons] → [incorporation into interpreting institution’s reason 
tree] → [use dispute input data and newly reformed reason tree to decide]. 
 
This general understanding of an interpretation takes many different 
forms. We see that a common law judge faced with the input data of disputing 
parties will attempt, following a level-three rule perceived at a level of com-
plexity sufficient for the task, to identify and to interpret “controlling prece-
dent.” The source institution here, of course, would be prior courts. 
Importantly, though, “interpretation” need not co-locate the data source 
and reason source.145 That is, the effort need not be to recover those of the 
 
 145. This way of speaking about the problem is compatible with Corey Yung’s “complete constitutional 
communication model,” which accounts for pretext, subtext, and later precedent. Yung, supra note 89, at 332. 
Mine is a more institution-based approach, associating each source of data with a modeled institution. 
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source’s reason trees that led to the dissemination of the information under con-
sideration (an original intention endeavor). Let us consider this possibility more 
carefully in the context of statutory interpretation. 
Ultimately, again, a judge applying a statute is concerned with the level-
two reasons he or she should use to decide the case. If a statute applies, then we 
already have a model of the legal system in which the statute is a relevant da-
tum. The critical point is that the statute itself is not a reason tree, but, if it is 
relevant, it must be translated into one. Ultimately, the question is how we 
should convert textual data into reasons for decisions. We have multiple op-
tions, and, critically, they are distinguished by the model of the legal system the 
deciding institution applies. Perhaps the statute is a datum that chiefly functions 
to aid the court in identifying the set of data it needs to reconstruct the reason 
tree of the institution that created the datum. 
Perhaps one’s level-four reasons for recognizing the salience of this da-
tum and its author point to the datum-creator’s authority running only so far as 
to control the sets of data it conveys to a truly authoritative institution, i.e., the 
one identified by the level-four theory as possessing the reason trees we seek to 
recover. For instance, suppose our theory demands that while the legislating 
body has the authority to choose the data to transmit, the meaning of those data 
and the reasons we are trying to recover are determined by the audience for the 
data, not its source. 
Under this theory, it is the job of the interpreting institution to recover the 
reasons as they would be found by that authoritative institution, the audience, 
given the datum-creator’s act of creation. If the authoritative institution is a 
broad subset of the public as it existed and processed information at the instant 
of the creation, then this model is an abstract public-meaning originalism. Al-
ready, we have a far more complex information-and-institutions model of the 
system than the simple sender-to-receiver model. 
Recognizing, though, that we lack access to information concerning the 
audience’s reasons, we might further refine our model, assuming that it was 
equivalent to a generic audience that processed information in predictable 
ways. Perhaps its processing can be sufficiently approximated by assuming it 
would translate words into reasons by passing the text through contemporary 
dictionaries and resolving ambiguities according to a set of fixed rules. This is 
originalist-oriented textualism, justified by the same level-four theory that led 
to public-meaning originalism. The basic move is to replace the ineffable but 
actual reason trees of the mass public with the interpretive equivalent of the ra-
tional actor model. That is, we replace impossibly complex collections of trees 
with a simple and linear program of text-to-reason mapping.146 
Canons are, therefore, models of institutional reasoning meant reasonably 
to approximate human interpretation, the rational interpreter model. One hope 
 
 146.  If we are fully invested in the authority of “the People” and are using approximation tools to realize 
it, then we are also trying to recover that institution’s level-four conclusions. Those conclusions concern its 
views concerning what motivations and information sources are relevant to its interpreting the information for 
which it is the audience. 
  
No. 4] MODELS OF LAW 1357 
of those who embrace this theory is that if courts publicize that they will use 
such canons and dictionaries, then the data-producing institution and the public 
that holds that institution accountable will act accordingly. And so even if the 
model it announces is false for existing data, in that it identifies with those ex-
isting data reasons that no modeled institution actually had, the canons-and-
dictionary choice might dynamically grant the theorized authority to those insti-
tutions.147 
All this suggests that an interpretation of a datum is a function of (a) a 
model of the legal system, (b) a choice of time at which the model is queried, 
(c) a level-three choice concerning the institution whose reason resulting from 
the datum will be adopted, and (d) a model of that institution’s reasons given 
the datum, meaning, in particular, a posited function that would map the datum 
to a reason that can then be adopted as the interpreting institution’s own or can, 
at least, alter the interpreting institution’s reasons. Interpretative disagreement 
within a legal system is not a single disagreement over a uni-dimensional array 
of methods but a multi-dimensional one, involving time, institutional choice, 
and approximation. 
C. Evaluation 
Reflecting on the generality of the experience of cooperation, one may 
naturally begin to wonder about the outer limits of law. If using “law” this way 
sweeps in too much of our experience of the universe, I would be open to the 
charge that I have charted nothing useful here, nothing distinctive about what is 
really going on when a court hands down a decision or a legislature passes a 
statute. But the move toward this theory’s brand of generalization and demarca-
tion is critical precisely because it shows just how much of our experience with 
the law that we label as such, the law we say we have, is a product of mental 
categorization consistent with a narrative about authority and constraint that 
could be otherwise. Our perceptions are perceptions. They gain power when 
they are shared. 
But what makes mine the right or at least a useful perspective? Ultimate-
ly, we are trying to get to know the practices of human beings better. “What is a 
human being? Legal theorists, perforce, must answer this question: jurispru-
dence, after all, is about human beings.”148 The simple answer to that question, 
however, is that we do not yet know. While a descriptive theory of law ground-
ed in posited individualized models of institutions, information, and rules helps 
to explain divergent legal opinions and practices, there is more research to do. 
As a matter of legal theory, I have suggested a language for the mental 
models we construct of legal practice. And I identify criteria, based on individ-
 
 147.  See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287–91 (2001) (refusing, when deciding whether a 
statute created an implied private right of action, to look outside statutory text for indicia of congressional in-
tent because the Court “found no evidence anywhere in the text to suggest that Congress intended to create a 
private right”). 
 148.  Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 1 (1988). 
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ual judgments concerning such models, for identifying a legal system and for 
distinguishing a system’s laws from things that are not its laws. I believe this 
understanding of law as modeling is “correct” at the very least in the sense that 
it usefully explains our intuitions of legal phenomena and that it explains both 
legal agreement and theoretical disagreement. Following the lead of Brian Lei-
ter, who borrows from the literature on theory choice in the sciences, we could 
identify for theories three desiderata: simplicity, comprehensiveness, and con-
servatism.149 Succinctly: theories that explain more phenomena, more simply, 
and with minimal damage to other “well-confirmed theories” are preferable.150 
The modeling theory excels in each respect: (a) giving a standardized account 
of ordinary intuitions concerning how institutions are constituted and connected 
and (b) adding a theory of agreement and acceptance to explain longstanding 
jurisprudential puzzles. And it does all this while illuminating why other ap-
proaches have explanatory power and theoretical attraction. At its core, the the-
ory gives a simple account of the law in our heads. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Roscoe Pound famously distinguished between the law in the books and 
the law in action.151 The former is the collection of writings of legislatures and 
courts, somehow ordered by the writings themselves. This understanding is law 
as the rule book. The latter point of view recognizes that law is active—that it 
is the actual experience of authority that the criminal defendant undergoes,152 
the unfolding deployment of reasons to justify orders. And while the past writ-
ings of institutions will be cited as composing those reasons, the doing of law is 
underdetermined by them. 
But neither is law to be found in objective description of behaviors. The 
law is not equivalent to a documentary film. It is more than the fact of action, 
just as it is more than books. There is also the law in the head. This, as we have 
seen, is where the consciousness of human beings and the inevitable conditions 
people impose on their mutual cooperation transform underdetermined, contra-
dictory, and vague writing or utterance into the fact of action.153 The real law 
arises from the ever-changing potential of a congregation of minds. And for ju-
risprudence to advance, it must turn to asking and answering questions about 
how human minds understand legal actions, form legal reasons, and transform 
those reasons into new actions. 
Do jurors and judges use similar types of models to resolve factual con-
flicts or to understand legal rules? 
 
 149.  Brian Leiter, Explaining Theoretical Disagreement, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1215, 1239 (2009). 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 16 (1910). 
 152.  Id. at 16–19. 
 153.  See supra note 40 and accompanying text (quoting and discussing Robert Cover’s theory of interpre-
tation as bonded word and deed). 
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Are opinions about legal rules formed by simulating applications of the law 
and responding to the results affectively? 
If so, are such simulations run with particular actors in institutional roles 
and particular actors as victims, defendants, and plaintiffs? 
Do these answers depend on experience, so that lawyers and judges use a 
more conceptual brand of processing than does the public?154 
It may be that, since at least the time of Holmes, the lawyer of the future 
has been the lawyer of statistics and economics,155 but the student of law has 
always been and will always be a student of us. Perhaps we are ready to move 
beyond introspection and dialogue to approach this study. Brain activation re-
search could be a next step to understanding how minds reach decisions 
through simplification of their physical and social worlds. 
A common language and set of starting points, as I have laid out here, can 
help to identify legal disagreements for what they often are: different under-
standings of how things are supposed to work. We perceive law differently, be-
tween one another and even within ourselves from moment to moment. And 
yet, we continue to cooperate. In seeking to understand this cooperation, we err 
when we attempt to capture its essence in an abstract rule that, as a matter of 
logic, circularly defines what it defines. In the end, we must never forget that it 
is a dynamic interaction of minds we are expounding. 
  
 
 154.  This hypothesis, that there are two such modes of cognition, is suggested by some cognitive scien-
tists. See Piotr Winkielman et al., Embodiment of Cognition and Emotion, in APA HANDBOOK OF PERSONALITY 
AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, VOLUME 1: ATTITUDES AND SOCIAL COGNITION 151–75 (2014) (“[N]ovel concepts 
are initially grounded in an embodied metaphor. However, if a metaphor is reused often enough, and the results 
of its use can be represented well by a semantic network, then semantic processing will be an efficient shortcut, 
eliminating the need for simulation.”). 
 155.  Holmes, supra note 15, at 469. 
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